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Abstract
The Internet has grown to support many vital functions, but it is not administered by any
central authority. Rather, the many smaller networks that make up the Internet — called
Autonomous Systems (ASes) — independently manage their own distinct host address space
and routing policy. Routers at the borders between ASes exchange information about how to
reach remote IP prefixes with neighboring networks over the control plane with the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP). This inter-AS communication connects hosts across AS boundaries
to build the illusion of one large, unified global network - the Internet.
Unfortunately, BGP is a dated protocol that allows ASes to inject virtually any routing
information into the control plane. The Internet’s decentralized administrative structure
means that ASes lack visibility of the relationships and policies of other networks, and have
little means of vetting the information they receive. Routes are global, connecting hosts
around the world, but AS operators can only "see" routes exchanged between their own
network and directly connected neighbor networks. This mismatch between global route
scope and local network operator visibility gives rise to adverse routing events like route
leaks, which occur when an AS mistakenly advertises a route that should have been kept
within its own network.
In this work, we explore our thesis: that malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten
Internet availability, but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact. Leaks effectively
reroute traffic meant for the leak destination along the leak path. This diversion of flows
onto unexpected paths can cause broad disruption for hosts attempting to reach the leak
destination, as well as obstruct the normal traffic on the leak path. These events are usually
due to misconfiguration and not malicious activity, but we show in our initial work that
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routing-capable adversaries can weaponize route leaks and fraudulent path advertisements
to enhance data plane attacks on Internet infrastructure and services.
Existing solutions like Internet Routing Registry (IRR) filtering have not succeeded
in solving the route leak problem, as globally disruptive route leaks still periodically
interrupt the normal functioning of the Internet. We examine one relatively new solution -
"Peerlocking" or defensive AS PATH filtering - where ASes exchange toplogical information
to secure their networks. Our measurements reveal that Peerlock is already deployed
in defense of the largest ASes, but has found little purchase elsewhere. We conclude
by introducing a novel leak defense system, Corelock, designed to provide Peerlock-like
protection without the scalability concerns that have limited Peerlock’s scope. Corelock
builds meaningful route leak filters from globally distributed route collectors and can be
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The Internet is composed of many smaller networks called Autonomous Systems (ASes),
each with distinct allocated IP prefixes and independent routing policy control. ASes
exchange routes to remote prefixes with neighboring networks over the control plane via
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates [69]. This inter-AS communication connects hosts
across AS boundaries to form an (ideally) seamless global Internet.
Unfortunately, errors or malicious actions in the route exchange process frequently
compromise the availability of Internet services. Route leaks [86], where an AS exports routes
meant to be kept internally or shared only with select neighbors, are an especially serious
problem. Because BGP updates do not carry the information required to easily distinguish
a valid route from an leaked one, leaks can rapidly spread throughout the topology as ASes
receive and propagate the mistake.
Leaks effectively steer some traffic bound for the leak’s destination along the leaked
path. This re-routing is problematic because the leaked route is, by definition, not the
intended path for this traffic. Often the leaked route is ill-provisioned to handle the additional
flows, resulting in relatively poor performance or complete loss of connectivity to destination
services for hosts in ASes that install and export the leak. Some leaks, like the 2017 Google-
Verizon leak that struck Japan [49], can broadly degrade Internet service for entire counties.
Leak mitigation usually involves slow out-of-band communication and cooperation between
leak destinations and route leakers, so even highly disruptive leaks can persist for hours.
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The 2019 Verizon-Cloudflare leak [45] (discussed in detail in Section 2.3) is a recent
and high profile example. A small AS in Pennsylvania leaked a number of routes to
Verizon, including several destined for leading content distribution network Cloudflare.
Verizon transmitted these routes globally, funneling Cloudflare-bound traffic through the
leaking edge network. This redirection caused two hours of degraded service for websites
and services backed by Cloudflare while the firm’s engineers worked to contact the
leaker [90]. At the incident’s peak, Cloudflare measured a 15% reduction in traffic moving
through their network [45]. This event, and other regionally or globally disruptive route
leaks [40, 22, 103, 78, 95, 50, 51] highlight the scale of the problem.
Most existing leak mitigation resources, like the many Internet Routing Registries (IRRs),
are challenging to leverage or limited in scope. IRRs are databases where ASes can publish
their routing policies. Other ASes can then convert IRR-stored policies into filters that
validate received routes against remote ASes’ published intent. IRR-based filtering is limited
by the correctness and freshness of information stored by remote ASes, however, so its
effectiveness hinges on broad inter-network participation. This is a serious limitation as
the motivations and sophistication of network operators varies greatly between ASes [41].
Other BGP security extensions, like the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [43],
only enable filtering for a subset of leaks (e.g. re-origination or too-specific leaks for RPKI).
1.1 Thesis Statement
We argue here that: Malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten Internet availability,
but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact. To demonstrate our thesis, we begin in
Chapter 3 by evaluating and highlighting the danger posed by routing capable adversaries
who weaponize BGP, showing how such an adversary can expose strategically valuable target
links to data plane assets. This work leads to an evaluation of current leak prevention systems
in Chapter 4, where we measure the distribution of one mitigation approach - defensive AS
path filtering or "Peerlocking" - among the largest transit providers, the Tier 1 networks.
Finally, we develop a novel system in Chapter 5 to extend protections against route leaks
beyond the Tier 1 peering clique. All figures and tables will be presented in the appendix.
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1.2 Outline
1.2.1 Chapter 3: Enhancing DDoS with Fraudulent or Intentionally
Leaked Routes
In our preliminary work, we introduce novel attacks to demonstrate how routing-capable
adversaries can exploit the lack of security controls in BGP to manipulate distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) flows [53]. This work motivates our study of adversarial routing
countermeasures. Our first attack, Maestro, describes how adversaries can inject fraudulent
BGP updates into the control plane to steer bot traffic onto target inter-AS links. Prior
DDoS attacks against these links (called Link Flooding Attacks or LFAs) failed to consider
how the AS-level topology partially or completely shields some links from botnets. We show
both where vulnerable links exist, and how specially formed (poisoned) BGP updates can
expose previously shielded links to attack by steering bot flows. We also outline a related
leak attack, wherein an adversary triggers an intentional route leak to expose links traversed
by the leak to malicious flows.
1.2.2 Chapter 4: Peerlock Route Leak Defense: Measurement and
Analysis
Discussions with AS operators about mitigating these attacks lead us to examine a relatively
new defensive filtering system, Peerlock [84]. Peerlock was introduced in 2016 to address
the need for a common-sense leak solution that large transit ASes can deploy between their
own networks without cooperation from un-incentivized peripheral ASes. While this system
was designed to stop leaks, it also prevents the spread of Maestro’s BGP updates. Our
preliminary work includes an active measurement of this system and one variant, Peerlock-
lite, on the control plane [55]. We demonstrate that Peerlock/Peerlock-lite are present
on the Internet, with deployment concentrated in the most influential global networks.
Further, we show that the filtering protection provided by these systems is limited to leaks
that transit core networks. This limitation is an artifact of Peerlock/Peerlock-lite design;
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these systems generally require out-of-band manual communication/configuration for each
additional protected network.
1.2.3 Chapter 5: Automated Route Leak Protection for Core
Networks
Recent systems, informed by a long history of halting BGP security rollouts, have prioritized
deployability at the expense of bulletproof security guarantees [26, 79, 84]. This thrust
acknowledges inter-domain routing’s fractured governance structure and enables transit
operators to make meaningful progress in protecting their own downstream networks with
an automated system inspired by Peerlock. Corelock defines practical leak filters that can be
assembled with only the tools available to an AS operator, e.g.: neighboring AS relationships,
publicly-available routing data from regional routing registries or other collection points, and




2.1 The Border Gateway Protocol
The Internet is a confederation of about 68,000 smaller networks, called Autonomous Systems
or ASes. ASes exchange routing information via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to
enable global connectivity. Each AS originates routes to its hosted prefixes; these routes are
advertised to neighbors via BGP updates. Each update contains a prefix and a collection
of other attributes, including an AS PATH that describes the route’s AS-level hops. ASes
compare all received updates via the BGP decision process to select a single best path to
every destination prefix. Both path qualities (like AS PATH length) and local network
policies (e.g., business relationship with advertising AS) are taken in account when selecting
a best path, but policies take precedence in the process. Once an AS selects a best path for
a given prefix, it prepends its unique AS number (ASN) to the path and advertises only that
path to its neighbors.
Paths learned from customer ASes - those purchasing transit - are advertised to all
connections. Provider-learned routes, meanwhile, are generally only advertised to an AS’s
customers. Peer ASes exchange traffic without compensation, and likewise advertise routes
learned from one another only to customer ASes. Limitations on non-customer learned
route export prevents customer ASes from transiting traffic between peers/providers at its
own expense. This dynamic, known as the Gao-Rexford or valley-free routing model [17],
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guides the exchange of routes on the control plane. No widely-deployed mechanism enforces
this model, but the economic incentives it describes shape AS path export behavior.
2.2 Customer Cones and Tiers
The customer cone [20] is an important abstraction arising from the valley-free model. An
AS’s recursive customer cone is the set of all ASes reachable from the AS via only provider to
customer links. Stated simply, these are the AS’s direct and indirect customers. Customer
cone size is one of the few publicly observable features commonly used to judge an AS’s
influence on the control plane, e.g. in CAIDA’s AS ranking [97]. Customer cone size is the
basis for the UCLA classification presented in [64] that is widely used in research on this
topic [81, 96, 2, 10, 101]. This scheme separates ASes into: 1) Tier 1 ASes, who have no
providers, form a peering clique, and can transit traffic to any prefix without compensation;
2) large ISPs with more than 50 customer cone ASes; 3) small ISPs with 5-50 customer cone
ASes; and 4) stub ASes with fewer than 5 direct/indirect customers. In general, we will use
the term customer cone to refer to the recursive customer cone. In Chapters 4 and 5, we
will employ a related abstraction: the provider-peer observed customer cone.
2.3 Route Leaks
Despite its vital role in binding together Internet networks, BGP is missing key security fea-
tures like cryptographic hardening of routes exchanged between ASes or trusted certification
binding ASes to owned prefixes. This leads to two common classes of major inter-domain
routing mishaps, prefix hijacking and route leaks. Prefix hijacks occur when a network, often
unintentionally, originates or advertises a fraudulent route to prefixes owned by another AS.
Traffic destined for those prefixes is then intercepted by the hijacker. A number of recent
studies focus on hijack mitigation; we focus on route leaks, so this falls outside the scope of
our work [26, 77, 72, 100].
Route leaks are defined in RFC 7908 as the propagation of an advertisement beyond
its intended scope [86]. Type 1-4 leaks all cover various valley-free routing violations, i.e.
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advertising one peer/provider’s routes to another peer/provider. Because remote ASes have
little or no information on relationships between non-neighboring networks, they generally
cannot distinguish leaks from valid routes, and may propagate them throughout the topology.
Type 5 leaks occur when one provider’s routes are announced to another with the AS PATH
stripped, effectively re-originating the prefix from the leaker. Finally, a Type 6 leak involves
an AS announcing routes used internally to its neighbors. These routes are often more
specific than externally announced routes; this makes the leaks more attractive in the BGP
decision process and encourages their spread to other remote networks.
As noted in the introduction, globally disruptive route leaks occur frequently [40, 78, 22,
50, 103, 51]. To describe how leaks propagate in greater detail, we examine the 2019 Verizon-
Cloudflare leak [45]. A small ISP, AS 33154, leaked specific internal prefixes (Type 6) to
Cloudflare and many other destinations to its customer, AS 396531. AS 396531 committed
a Type 1 leak by advertising this route to its other provider, AS 701 Verizon. Verizon
propagated the leak, which spread widely on the control plane because it was more specific
than legitimate available routes (see depiction in Fig. 1). This leak exhibits a number
of features common to routing failures with wide impact: 1) large networks are involved
in distribution, 2) many prefixes or prefixes that host in-demand services are leaked, and
3) outages and high relative latency continue until the leak is corrected via out-of-band
communication.
2.4 BGP Poisoning
BGP poisoning is a technique designed to manipulate the BGP decision process in remote
networks. ASes originating a prefix can poison an advertisement by including the ASNs
of remote networks in the AS PATH. Often, the poisoned ASNs will be inserted between
copies of the origin’s ASN. This "sandwiching" ensures traffic is routed properly and that
the advertisement is valid for Route Origin Verification (ROV) filtering purposes (see
Fig. 2). BGP prevents cycles from forming in the topology by requiring ASes to drop routes
containing their own ASN in the AS PATH; this feature is known as BGP loop detection.
So, all networks included in the poisoned update’s AS PATH - the poisoned ASes - will filter
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it. Poisons are generally used for inbound traffic engineering purposes [82, 81, 39], but we
also employ them in our preliminary work to mimic route leaks transiting the poisoned AS.
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Chapter 3
Enhancing DDoS with Fraudulent or
Intentionally Leaked Routes
3.1 Introduction
Our initial work demonstrates the danger posed by fraudulent routes to proper Internet
functioning. In this chapter, we develop combined control- and data-plane attacks that allow
adversaries to concentrate (amplify) distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against
target links. DDoS attacks direct traffic from many distinct sources on the Internet to
overwhelm the capacity of links or end hosts. These attacks proliferate despite extensive
academic and economic investment in mitigation, and intensify with the Internet’s expansion
to new devices and services. A reflection attack fueled by unprotected memcached servers, for
example, temporarily disabled Github [52]. Link Flooding Attacks or LFAs are DDoS attacks
against infrastructure links rather than end hosts. Prominent examples in the literature
include the Coremelt [91], Crossfire [35], and CXPST [74] attacks. Worryingly, LFAs could
be moving from proposed attacks to present threat. In 2016, a Mirai botnet-sourced attack
directed over 500 Gbps of traffic to a Liberian infrastructure provider in a real-world LFA [76].
In order for an LFA adversary to successfully target a link, the adversary must be able to
direct traffic from bots to destinations such that the traffic traverses the target link. However,
while end hosts control their traffic’s destination, they cannot control the path taken by that
traffic. Network operators for the Autonomous System (AS) that bots reside within choose
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outbound paths for their flows. This means that links have varied exposure to LFAs due to
routing choices. For some targets, an attacker may find destinations for individual bots such
that the entire botnet sends traffic over some target link; for others, bots may have no such
paths.
Prior academic work fails to deeply address this topological constraint. For example,
Coremelt [91] only quantified if an adversary could flood at least one link of the ten
largest ASes by degree, but did not quantify how many links were impacted for those ASes.
CXPST [74] targeted links based on control plane properties, and recognized in their results
that many likely target links are out of the attacker’s reach. Most recently, Crossfire [35]
explored the ability of LFAs to disconnect geographic regions. However, their experiments
used paths from PlanetLab nodes both as their model for botnet traffic propagation and
overall topology, meaning that by definition the only links considered in their model were
those their "botnet" could reach.
In Section 3.3, we quantify the vulnerability of Internet links to LFAs with simulations
that join CAIDA’s inferred Internet topology with botnet models backed by real-world bot
distributions. For one of our link sample sets, we found that just 18% to 23% of links are
traversable by the majority of bots in three major botnets, and fewer than 10% of sampled
links were vulnerable to more than 75% of bots. Even if we restrict our set of targets to the
10% most traversed links, the majority are reachable by less than 20% of the botnet.
In Section 3.4, we investigate how routing-capable adversaries can expose potential LFA
targets inadvertently shielded by routing choices. The result is a novel attack, Maestro, that
orchestrates remote AS path selection and malicious bot flows to degrade links outside the
reach of traditional LFAs. Our attack requires an adversary to have two tools: a botnet
and limited control of a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) speaker. The Maestro attack
utilizes a traffic engineering technique called BGP poisoning to adjust bots’ inbound path
to the compromised BGP speaker’s network so they include a target link. The attacker
then launches a traditional DDoS attack against the compromised BGP speaker’s network,
resulting in attack flows funneled over the target link.
We demonstrate Maestro’s ability to both amplify LFAs for already-vulnerable links and
extend a botmaster’s reach to previously unexposed targets in simulation. After executing
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the Maestro attack from a well-positioned adversary, more than 90% of sampled links are
exposed to a majority of bots across each botnet, and 85% to 87% of links are exposed to
75% or more bots. Our analysis explores a number of different target link/compromised
BGP speaker selection methods to discover how these properties factor into attack success.
The results of these evaluations are explored in depth in Section 3.7, where we analyze two
Maestro adversary types.
We validate Maestro’s underlying mechanisms with experimental "attacks" on the live
Internet in Section 3.5. From two different "compromised" routers, we achieved 2x or
greater flow density improvement against target Internet links. Following our experiments,
we consider defenses to mitigate Maestro, exploring the relative effectiveness of each via
simulation, with in-depth discussion of results. Our goal is to give a first look into
mitigation techniques network operators can individually deploy to protect their own links
from the Maestro attack. Feedback from outreach to the network operator community is
also presented.
We make the following key contributions:
• We measure how Internet routing properties limit Link Flooding Attacks in Section 3.3.
• We develop a technique to overcome these limitations: the Maestro attack. We describe
and evaluate the attack via realistic simulations on an up-to-date Internet model in
Section 3.4.
• We ethically execute Maestro proofs-of-concept on the live Internet in Section 3.5.
• We develop a broad understanding of the Internet’s vulnerability to Maestro in
Section 3.7.
• We describe a related valley path leak attack targeting Tier 1 peering links in
Section 3.6 and evaluate it with the same simulation framework.
• We propose and evaluate mitigations to our attack, as well as seek operator feedback
from mailing lists in Section 3.8.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 DDoS and Link Flooding Attacks
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) describes a coordinated attack on a target link or
end host availability with traffic from multiple sources. A common flow source for these
attacks are botnets, or networks of compromised end hosts (bots) under an attacker’s control.
Botnets can include PCs, IoT devices, and/or SCADA systems, and are available for rent
as attack sources from illicit online marketplaces. The most common form of DDoS is
volumetric DDoS, where an attacker overwhelms a target with malicious traffic flows. These
attacks have been carried out by nation-states [71, 25], and can also be used to isolate or
degrade Internet performance for large geographic regions by targeting core DNS or network
infrastructure providers.
A more recent class of DDoS attacks, Link Flooding Attacks (LFAs), targets network
infrastructure rather than end hosts. One of the first such attacks in the literature is
Coremelt [91]. Coremelt specifies that a botmaster: 1) maps which links are present on
paths on routes between bots; 2) targets a specific link used on paths between many bots;
and 3) directs bot traffic between bots over the link. The resulting n2 flows (for n bots
with paths over the link) overwhelms benign traffic on the target link. The bot traffic is
especially difficult to classify/filter as it is "wanted" by the destination host and therefore
appears legitimate. The Crossfire attack, like Coremelt, targets Internet links, but has the
more ambitious goal of isolating an entire region (military installation, university, geographic
region, etc.) by targeting key links [35]. Rather than directing traffic to one another, bots
map paths to publicly available web services (decoys) that transit target links. Bots then
send sustained, low-intensity flows to decoys to execute the attack, a pattern that makes
Crossfire extremely difficult to detect and counter.
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3.3 Can Botnets Target any Link?
Link Flooding Attacks (see Section 3.2.1 earlier) hinge on the botmaster’s ability to drive
traffic over a target link. First, the botmaster must find paths from bots to remote
destinations that cross the target link. Next, they must direct flows over these paths to
aggregate traffic at the target and exhaust its capacity. If the attacker’s flows overwhelm the
link, "drowning out" benign traffic, the attack is successful. Bots without a path to some
destination that includes the target link cannot participate in the attack.
This path requirement is largely unaddressed by prior work on LFAs. Researchers often:
1) do not perform their measurements with distribution data from a real botnet, notably
Kang et al.’s Crossfire [35]; 2) assume botnets can direct significant flows over arbitrary
links on the Internet without evidence, as in Tran et al.’s examination of the feasibility of
re-routing based LFA defenses [96]; and/or 3) target links most accessible to botnet flows,
as in Coremelt [91], CXPST [74], and Crossfire. In fact, both target selection and attack
success for Crossfire is measured via a degradation ratio that only considers links exposed
to bots. These limitations raise questions about how well LFAs can target arbitrary links in
the Internet topology. Here we explore those questions with Internet-scale BGP simulation.
3.3.1 Simulation Methodology
Our experiments are performed by extending the Chaos BGP simulator from prior work [75,
96, 82, 74] with new modules. Chaos builds the Internet’s BGP topology based on publicly
available inferred AS relationship data from CAIDA [98]. In the simulator, ASes perform
a simplified BGP decision process for path selection that includes longest prefix matching,
path selection based on LOCAL PREF and AS PATH, and route export based on local
policy. Since true local AS policies are private, this is the most accurate simulation of AS
behavior we can devise. We model our simulator’s poison mechanics on the live Internet’s
treatment of BGP poisoning [80, 39, 2].
For each attack, we use three botnet models based on Mirai, Conficker, and Blackenergy
botnet IP measurements. Our botnet models are built from passive and active measurements
of infected hosts from a variety of sources. The Mirai botnet model includes 2.29 million IP
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addresses in 11,633 ASes. These addresses were recorded by a Chinese CDN as they spread
the malware, a process with a unique signature [60]. Our Conficker model contains 2.28
million bot IPs from 12,095 ASes found by detecting bot rendezvous points and monitoring
traffic to these points [94]. The Blackenergy model is a SCADA-focused botnet developed
from similar techniques as presented in [9] with a total of 310,943 bot IPs across 4,291 ASes.
Note these IP counts may not represent true botnet size given DHCP churn and other factors;
in this work, we are primarily concerned with AS distribution of bots rather than counting
infected hosts.
3.3.2 Vulnerability Experiments
Our initial experiments in the simulator measure the vulnerability of Internet links to LFAs.
We build the AS-level topology as described above and classify links in two ways - relative
usage and vulnerability. We quantify link usage with betweenness, defined as the number of
times a link appears on paths between any pair of ASes in the simulator. Fig. 5a shows the
cumulative distribution of betweenness for simulated Internet links. Most links appear on
100 or fewer AS paths. Select links, however, have a betweenness of more than 1 million.
Attacks on these critical links would wreak havoc with upstream and downstream networks,
and cause widespread disruption in Internet services. We quantify link vulnerability with
flow density : the percentage of a botnet’s infected hosts with simulated paths over the target
link to either 1) another bot-hosting AS, called bot-to-bot flow density, or 2) any destination
AS, called bot-to-any flow density. The bot-to-bot flow density models the effectiveness of a
Coremelt-style attack; the bot-to-any flow density roughly follows the Crossfire attack.
To show how link vulnerability and usage are related, Fig. 5b plots bot-to-bot flow
density on the x-axis against betweenness on the y-axis. Not unexpectedly, some low
betweenness (peripheral) links are wholly outside an LFA attacker’s reach. We note that
relaxing our attack technique by allowing bots to send traffic to any AS destination does not
significantly alleviate these limitations, as shown in Fig. 5c. Critically, some moderate
to high betweenness (core) links are also partially or completely devoid of paths
between bots. This experiment provides evidence that botnet-sourced LFAs can be limited
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by topological factors. While we found that low betweenness links are most difficult to reach,
even highly trafficked links are not always fully exposed to botnet flows.
3.4 The Maestro Attack
The prior section demonstrates that most links, including many likely LFA targets, are
shielded from the full force of major botnets. This condition arises from the lack of end host
control over traffic routes; bots cannot always find a destination for their flows that cross a
target link. In this section, we introduce the Maestro attack, the first combination of traffic
engineering techniques with LFAs. Maestro alters the control plane to increase target flow
density and extend a botmaster’s reach to previously shielded links.
3.4.1 Threat Model
To execute the attack, an adversary requires 1) command of a botnet and 2) control of a
BGP speaker, i.e., an AS’s edge router. The first item is trivially obtainable, as botmasters
routinely monetize their networks by renting them out in an attack-as-a-service model on the
dark web [67]. Recent events demonstrate that multiple feasible avenues exist for
adversaries to gain routing capability. The 3ve fraud operation [23] demonstrated the
most straightforward route - simply registering a new AS. Insider attacks from disgruntled
network operators, e.g. the Canadian bitcoin hijack [47], are another path to adversarial
routing capability. Note that edge routers themselves need not be compromised to launch
the attack - it is sufficient to compromise router configuration systems, as may have occurred
in the XLHost ISP breach [33]. However, recent Cisco router vulnerability disclosures show
that remote attacks on edge routers are also a realistic attack vector [13, 11, 12]. Finally,




Since bots are located in disparate ASes, an adversary who seeks to control bot traffic paths
must adjust the best path at each bot-containing remote network. Obviously, if the adversary
compromised all these ASes, they could change paths directly, but such an adversary is
far more powerful than the one in our threat model. Maestro’s central insight is that an
adversary who controls one edge router in a single AS can influence remote networks’ paths to
that AS. If an adversary first directs bot traffic to an AS/prefix they control (the compromised
AS or adversary AS ), the adversary can orchestrate those flows onto a target link with
poisoned BGP advertisements (like a conductor, or maestro). We call the origin endpoint of
the target link the From AS and destination endpoint of the target link the To AS. In effect,
Maestro also executes a traditional DDoS against the adversary AS. This is of little concern
to an adversary who compromises another entity’s AS. Fig. 6 shows the attack in abstract,
with link 5 7→ 8 as the target. Before the attack, traffic from bot-hosting ASes (ASes 0-
3) to the adversary (AS 10) flows around (and not over) the target link. Our adversary
compromises AS 10, and issues specific prefix advertisements with ASes 4 and 6 poisoned.
This causes inbound flows from the bot-hosting ASes to the adversary to concentrate over
the target link. After altering these paths, the adversary AS (AS 10) directs bot traffic to
itself. The result is a channeled DDoS flowing over 5 7→ 8.
3.4.3 Poison Selection Algorithm
BGP poisoning is a primitive that moves inbound traffic off a chosen link as seen in prior
related work [39, 82]. Our adversary’s core challenge is different - they want to find a set
of poisons (the poison set) that focuses traffic onto a target link. Finding a poison set that
successfully steers bot traffic is non-trivial, because poisons can conflict - successfully steering
one AS can block others from traversing the target link. Additionally, each poison extends
the poisoning advertisement’s AS PATH, and excessively long paths are often filtered [96].
The adversary uses traceroutes [32] to determine bot paths as in [35, 91].
The following iterative poison choice heuristic represents the core of the Maestro
attack. This algorithm finds a poison set for some adversary/target pairing, after which
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the adversary needs only to issue the poisoned advertisement and direct bot traffic to the
poisoned prefix to complete the attack. Our algorithm works by iteratively partitioning ASes
into four sets:
Algorithm: Poison Choice Heuristic
function ChoosePoisons (From, To,Adv, Sources, n)
Input : From AS From, To AS To, adversary AS Adv, source ASes Sources,
poison limit n
Output: poison set Poisons
Poisons = ∅
while Sources 6= ∅ and |Poisons| < n do
B = {b | b is a bgp path To 7→ Adv}
Sacred = {From, To,Adv}+
⋂|B|
i=1Bi
Success += {s | s ∈ Sources and {From, To} ∈ s 7→ Adv}
Disconn += {s | s ∈ Sources and no specific-prefix path s 7→ Adv})
Sources −= {Sacred ∪ Success ∪Disconn}
Score = [0] ∗ |Sources|
foreach si ∈ Sources do





Adv sends advertisement to poison Poisons
end
Sacred ASes are those the adversary cannot poison, as doing so would disconnect the
target link from the adversary AS. It is initialized with the From AS, the To AS, and the
adversary AS. It is updated at each iteration with every AS that appears on all paths from
the To AS to the adversary AS, as determined by traceroutes from bots to the adversary AS.
Naturally, we must have a path for traffic from the target link to the poisoning prefix, so these
ASes should never be poisoned. Disconnected ASes include poisoned ASes and those without
a route to the advertising prefix that does not transit a poisoned AS. Successful ASes are
those hosting bots whose traceroutes transit the target link to the adversary. Lastly, Source
ASes are those hosting bots that are not yet assigned to another set.
After these sets are updated, we select an AS to poison from the source ASes and add it
to the poison set. To accomplish this, we select the AS with the highest vertex betweenness
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on the directed graph formed by traceroutes from remaining source ASes to the adversary.
This is the poison that invalidates the maximum number of source paths that avoid the
target link. While no guarantee exists that source ASes will then select a path that contains
the target link, we at least remove a common hop that avoids the link. We update all
ASes’ set membership based on their current traceroutes to the adversary after receiving the
update poisoned for all poison set members. Finally, we move to the next iteration. We will
terminate iteration once the source set is empty, or if the poison set (which is included in the
AS PATH as described in Section 2.4) causes the AS PATH to exceed the size AS operators
will almost certainly filter in practice: around 254 hops [96, 66]. We show in Section 3.8 that
this condition is rarely met.
3.4.4 Evaluation
To evaluate Maestro’s impact, we choose thousands of target link/adversary AS pairings for
simulated botnet attacks in the framework described in Section 3.3.1. We aim to understand
link vulnerability characteristics, and to show how target/adversary topological positions
affect flow density. For each attack, we measure pre-attack flow density for the target, which
represents the target’s present vulnerability to LFAs. Next, we execute the Maestro attack
to concentrate bot traffic. Finally, we measure post-attack flow density to quantify our
success in steering bot-hosting ASes onto the target link. For most experiments, we make
bot-to-bot (Coremelt-style) flow density measurements; when using bot-to-any based target
link sampling, we will instead measure bot-to-any flow density.
Attacking From the Customer Cone
We initially simulated Maestro on 2,000 randomly selected links with adversaries randomly
selected from nearby (1-3 AS-level hops) ASes to illuminate our attack’s limits. The attack
was generally unsuccessful, but two common success conditions emerged. First, successful
attackers were almost universally located in the customer cone of the target link destination
(the To AS). This is because path export rules are most generous for customers, as ASes
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provide their customers with all known best paths in hopes of transiting their traffic. So, we
expect customer ASes will find the maximum number of attack paths - valley-free paths from
flow sources to adversary AS that cross the target - among all potential attackers. Second, we
observe that flow density improvement for successful attacks varied inversely with attacker
distance from the target link. This is an intuitive result; distance increases the number of
alternate inbound paths that avoid the target link.
With this knowledge, we next sample 100 links each with relatively low, intermediate,
and high betweenness/flow-density. For each target link, we sample three adversaries at
each depth from 1-3 in the To AS customer cone. This results in about 1800 adversary/link
pairings per link sample set, and about 5400 total simulated attacks. The results are shown
in Figures 4a and 4b. Because we observed similar patterns in success across botnet models,
we present only Mirai results here. For direct customers of high betweenness links, on average
an additional 30% of the total bots in the botnet can target the link (Fig. 4b). For low
betweenness links, attack impact is negligible, but these links are not likely targets for LFAs.
A deeper examination of the data yields insights on successful Maestro scenarios. First,
target link relationship is critical to attack success. For an adversary in the To AS customer
cone, attack paths are most prevalent when the To AS is a customer of the From AS; that
is, the target link is a provider to customer link. This is an intuitive finding; any bot AS
that must transit a provider to customer link to reach the target link cannot then transit a
customer to provider link and remain valley-free. Like locating the adversary in the To AS
customer cone, targeting a provider to customer link removes a potential valley from attack
paths, but at rather than after the target link. The importance of this dynamic is shown
in the relative distribution of flow density gains by link relationship in Fig. 4c. Virtually all
successful cases for this experiment were on provider to customer links.
Fig 4a displays pre vs. post attack flow density for the same betweenness link sample
in Fig 3a, filtered to include only provider to customer links. Here we see results for the
ideal case for the attack: an adversary AS located in the customer cone of the To AS, when
the target link is a provider to customer link. The region between the curves in this figure
represents the attacker’s gain from executing Maestro. Before the attack, most sampled links
have flow densities below 10% - that is, most link targets are vulnerable to 10% or fewer bots
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in a Coremelt LFA. After Maestro execution, roughly half of sampled links have
greater than 50% flow density.
Customer to Provider Link Attacks
Our previous experiment highlights the roles that target link relationship and adversary
position play in attack path prevalence. Since most Internet services require bidirectional
communication, the simplest method for attacking customer to provider links is to attack
the opposite direction; i.e., target the associated provider to customer link. To confirm this
method’s viability, we reverse the target link direction for all customer to provider links from
our betweenness link sample set with <1% post-attack flow density in the prior experiment.
We then sample adversaries from the new To AS customer cones and simulate attacks. Fig. 7
shows the results of these reversed attacks. Clearly, link relationship was the primary culprit
preventing attack success, as attacking the reversed direction yields drastically improved
flow density. For most links, we see 50% or greater post-attack flow density, meaning that
we expect to engineer most bot traffic onto the target.
However, if an adversary has already compromised an AS in the To AS customer cone of
a customer to provider link, the adversary cannot always attack the reversed direction; this
requires compromising a different AS. So, we ask now under what conditions the customer
to provider direction can be successfully attacked. The only attack paths available in this
case originate from within the From AS customer cone, because any flow sources not located
there must transit a peering or provider to customer link before reaching the target link. This
means that potential targets are limited to those with significantly bot-infected From AS
customer cones. To test our ability to steer bot traffic in these scenarios, we randomly sample
300 links from above the 9th deciles for From AS customer cone infection rate from the set
of all customer to provider links, simulate attacks, and measured flow density improvement.
We find that we can exert significant steering influence on bots in the From AS customer
cone as shown in Fig. 8.
While the Maestro attack is most effective for attacking links between customers and
providers, the concept of leveraging routing capability to expose links to attack could be
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extended to peer links, as well. While the details of such an attack fall outside the scope
of this chapter, we will briefly sketch one possible technique. Peer links (like customer to
provider links) are generally only exported within the peers’ customer cones, so an adversary
wishing to expose such a link would require routing capability at an AS located within the
link endpoints’ cones. From that position, an adversary could trigger an intentional route
leak to a destination that crosses the peering link to expose it to attack; this is analogous to
the role of poisoned advertisements in the Maestro attack. Further work could explore the
effectiveness of this technique.
3.4.5 Incomplete Path Information
The Maestro adversary must poison bottlenecks in off-target paths from bots to the
compromised AS to concentrate traffic on the target link. As in prior LFAs [35, 91], path
information is collected via the traceroute utility [32]. Traceroutes are resolved to AS-
level paths by a IP-to-ASN mapping service like Team Cymru’s [93]. While traceroute is
commonly used for topological discovery, the information provided by the tool is incomplete
in practice for a number of reasons. For example, traceroute responses are delivered via
ICMP, which some router operators disable or rate limit for security reasons [24]. These
ICMP controls yield occasional missing hops in the path data provided by traceroute. So,
we want to examine Maestro’s sensitivity to incomplete bot path information.
We investigate two classes of missing information: 1) missing some AS-level hops across
all bot traceroutes, and 2) missing path information for some bot-hosting ASes. The first
class models failure to respond to traceroute probes by some routers along bot traffic paths,
possibly due to outgoing ICMP controls, packet loss, or opaque tunneling. We consider
missing AS-level hops; this is a more challenging condition than missing single IP-level
hops, since any one reported intra-AS hop is sufficient to resolve the AS-level hop. The
second class represents failure to collect traceroute data from some bot-hosting ASes due
to command-and-control software problems, intermittent connectivity issues, or network
controls on incoming ICMP. Because BGP requires ASes to select a single best path to
any destination prefix, all bots within an AS are expected to utilize the same path to
the compromised AS. For this reason, a single traceroute per bot AS is sufficient to find
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bottlenecks, but we consider the stronger case where no path information is provided for a
sampled subset of bot ASes.
A 2006 study found 2% of router hops were anonymized in traceroutes [3], but we know
of no current, authoritative source for the percentage of routers anonymized or missing from
traces. Similarly, we cannot determine a realistic figure for how many bot traces could be lost
entirely. Given this lack of data, we perform our experiments by re-simulating the customer
cone attack from Section 3.4.4 with the Mirai botnet on the betweenness link sample across a
broad range of missing information percentages - 2, 10, 20, 40, and 60% missing information.
This is the percentage of ASes not appearing on traceroutes for the missing AS-level hops
experiment, and separately, the percentage of bot ASes reporting no path information. The
results are presented in Fig. 9. The percentage of missing information is on the x-axis and
the ratio of flow density gain with missing information to flow density gain with perfect
information is on the y-axis.
We find that the missing traceroute hop information has a measurable but modest effect
on achieved flow density. Even with 20% of AS-level hops deleted from bot to compromised
AS paths, an order of magnitude more than reported in [3], more than 75% of the full
information attack effect is achieved. This is an intuitive result, as the adversary does not
require the complete path to select the next poison; rather, only the bottleneck must be
determined. Additionally, even if the ideal bottleneck hop does not respond to probing,
poisoning another hop along shared off-target paths is likely to shift some traffic onto the
target link. The absence of traceroute data from some bot ASes (dotted line) has a more
significant impact on Maestro performance, but nearly 60% of the complete information
effect is retained even when 10% of bot ASes do not provide any path information.
3.5 Internet Experiments
We built an experimental Maestro implementation with the PEERING BGP testbed [73] and
the RIPE Atlas framework [89] to 1) validate the basic steering mechanisms behind Maestro
and 2) explore what real-world dynamics could affect the attack. PEERING allows us to
originate routes from its points of presence (PoPs) worldwide hosting BGP edge routers.
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RIPE Atlas provides a distributed probe network for data plane measurements including
ping, traceroute, DNS, SSL/TLS and NTP. A subset of these probes, called anchors,
periodically form a publicly accessible "mesh" measurement of all-to-all traceroutes.
A single PEERING PoP serves as the adversary’s compromised AS. All responsive RIPE
Atlas anchors (n ≈ 580) across roughly 470 ASes function as the experimental "botnet".
To measure flow density, we combine anchor mesh measurements with traceroutes from
anchors to the compromised AS, mapping IP-level hops to AS-level ones using Team Cymru’s
mapping service [93]. Total flow density includes all anchors with paths to one another or
the compromised AS that transit the target. Figure A shows the global distribution of our
"bots".
We conduct the "attack" by first selecting a target from links within three AS-level
hops of the compromised AS. Next, we originate an unpoisoned /24 advertisement from the
compromised AS and measure pre-attack flow density. Finally, we iteratively select poisons
and issue poisoned advertisements for the /24 as described in Section 3.4.2 to steer traffic over
the target link. After the attack, we issue new traceroutes to compare achieved flow density
with the original measurement. We perform this procedure on two target links/PEERING
PoP pairings.
Ethics
All control plane advertisements are protocol compliant, and all data plane measurements
target PEERING prefixes that host only our experimental workstation, so no Internet traffic
was affected except our own. Measurements were made with Paris traceroutes [3] using
3 packets of 48 bytes each originating from fewer than 600 RIPE Atlas anchors. The
total additional network traffic on any affected link is less than 100KB per measurement.
Measurements are spaced by at least one minute. We assess that the potential for our




The Clemson University PoP is the compromised AS for our first experiment. We select
209 7→ 2722, a link from the Tier 1 clique to the compromised AS’s upstream provider
AS2722, as our target. This link is two topological hops from the compromised AS. Zero
bots transit this link to one another or to the compromised AS prior to the attack; we
identified the link from CAIDA’s topology [98]. So, the pre-attack bot-to-bot flow density
was 0%. This does not indicate the link is unused, only that it is not used to transit traffic
between bots and the compromised AS.
AS174 is the most common AS on inbound bot paths and would be our first poison choice,
but poisoning this AS disconnects the majority of bot ASes. We observe this behavior in both
Internet experiments when attempting to poison Tier 1 ASes, so we suspect that defensive
filtering of Tier 1 poisons [84] is to blame. Because AS2722’s direct connections are still
able to reach the compromised AS, we suspect that filtering occurred at Tier 1 providers.
To avoid such disconnections, we skip AS174 and continue the algorithm. After finding 2
poisons, nearly all (533 / 576 bots) transit the target 209 7→ 2722. The remaining bots
either directly connect to AS2722 (20 bots in AS15169 Google) or were disconnected from
the compromised AS (13 bots). Maestro execution enhances flow density from 0%
pre-attack to over 90% after.
Utah Results
The PEERING PoP behind Utah Education Network (AS210) is our second compromised
AS. We selected a Tier 1 to Tier 1 link 3 hops from the compromised AS, 174 7→ 209, as the
target. The original flow density on this link is about 7% - 45 / 576 bots had bot-to-bot paths
that transited this target link before the attack, and none used it to reach the compromised
AS.
Our first poison choice would be AS1299, but poisoning this Tier 1 AS triggers the
disconnection of most bot ASes as in the Clemson experiment. We again suspect Tier 1
ASes filtering Tier 1 poisons is to blame, so we continue the algorithm without poisoning
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AS1299 or other Tier 1 providers. The attack finds 3 poisons that steer roughly 16% (91
/ 576) of bots over the target link to the compromised AS. 106 bots transited the target
link to reach either another probe or the compromised AS. Overall, the attack modifies
probe flow density from 7% to above 18%, a greater than 2x improvement in
flow density.
Discussion
We find substantial evidence of Tier 1 filtering of Tier 1 poisons during our experiments
consistent with a recent BGP interception study, SICO [6]. We note that SICO’s path
export communities could provide a mechanism to further concentrate traffic when Maestro
is limited by Tier 1 poison filtering. This filtering is largely a byproduct of defensive AS
PATH filtering as described in Chapter 4.
3.6 The Leak Attack
None of our previous evaluations have targeted peer links. In the CAIDA inferred topology,
however, about 410,000 of 660,000 total Internet links are peering links. These links play
a critical role in transiting traffic between Tier 1 providers in the Internet’s core. Like
customer to provider links, attack path viability in this case is limited by BGP path export
rules. Unlike those targets, we cannot simply reverse the direction of the attack; peer link
export rules are the same for both endpoints. A Maestro attacker is therefore limited to bot
flow sources that exist inside the From AS customer cone.
3.6.1 Attack Overview
An AS located in the From AS customer cone of a peer link target is not limited to the
Maestro attack. An adversary who has compromised an AS there has a much simpler means
of altering the control plane to increase flows: leaking valley paths that cross the target
link. By leaking, we mean that the adversary AS advertises to its other providers/peers
valley paths over the target link to bot-infected ASes in the To AS customer cone. That
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is, the adversary exports a route that crosses the target link en route to a direct/indirect
customer of the To AS. Normally, these paths would only be advertised to the compromised
AS’s customers; the compromised AS has no interest in transiting traffic between providers
at its own expense. But if the AS has been compromised by an adversary, or the AS’s
operators value attacking the target link above the cost of the attack traffic, this technique
could be an effective means of exposing the peer leak to malicious flows. Figures 11a and 11b
illustrate this technique, which we term a leak attack. Note that nothing prevents data-plane
traffic from transiting valley paths; the Gao Rexford model is upheld strictly by path export
decisions. While we only evaluate the leak attack in the context of peer links, an adversary
could similarly leak a customer to provider link.
Unlike the Maestro attack, leak attack traffic transits the adversary AS before crossing
the target link. So, this attack is limited in flow density improvement by the capacity of
the adversary AS’ inbound links, as well as the capacity of links between the adversary AS
and the From AS (its direct or indirect provider). Of course, the attacker does not need
to consume the entire capacity of the target peer link, only to increase flow density such
that normal and malicious traffic together exhaust link capacity. Here we present results
without consideration for potential pre-target bottlenecks, with an examination of relative
link capacities left to future work.
3.6.2 Evaluation
We evaluate this leak attack on the Tier 1 clique; that is, all 400 peer links connecting the 20
Tier 1 providers. For each target link, we sample adversaries from 1-3 hops in the From AS
customer cone, and measure bot-to-bot flow density before and after the adversary AS leaks
all routes containing the target link. Fig. 11c shows the pre vs. post attack CDF by flow
density for these simulations. According to CAIDA’s inferred topology and our real-world
botnet IP mappings, these critical links in the Internet’s core are almost completely isolated
from potential LFA traffic before the attack. Under all botnet models, we observed significant
improvements. For the Mirai botnet, for instance, roughly half of Tier 1 link/adversary AS
pairings had post-attack flow densities of 20% or greater. Notably, these Tier 1 to Tier 1
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links have virtually no vulnerability before the attack, and 50% or greater exposure to IPs
in major botnets after leak execution from a small customer.
3.6.3 Leak Defense
Leak attack mitigation is a challenging problem. No current, widely deployed method exists
to filter advertised valley paths in general. Worse, ground-truth AS relationships are not
publicly available. In fact, valley paths have been observed on the Internet in practice
and studied in prior work [21]. The cost of transiting attack traffic over the leaked route
could be prohibitive for some adversaries, though this would not dis-incentivize an attacker
who has compromised (does not actually own) the AS. The surest defense for upstream
providers who wish to defend themselves from this attack is monitoring advertisements from
their customer cone for leaked routes. In response to suspect advertisements, the defender
could respond by disconnecting the violator. Finally, defensive filtering with out-of-band
relationship information as observed in Section 3.5 and in the SICO attack [6] could deter
this attack.
3.7 Attack Scope and Vulnerability
As shown in Section 3.4.4, Maestro adversary is most successful when they 1) target a
provider to customer link and 2) compromise a direct/indirect customer of the To AS. In
this section, we explore the Internet’s vulnerability to two Maestro attacker types: strategic
and opportunistic. The opportunistic adversary achieves routing capability at some arbitrary
AS, and exploits their position to attack upstream links, e.g. as part of a ransom DDoS.
For this attacker, a key question is how many more critical links the adversary can attack
with Maestro. The strategic adversary targets a specific link or links for broader strategic
purposes, e.g. disrupting key services. For this attacker, we want to quantify the pool size
of potential attacking ASes given some target link.
Opportunistic Adversary: To answer how Maestro enables the opportunistic adversary,
we compare the number of links the adversary can attack with Maestro to the number that
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can be attacked with a Crossfire LFA. For every AS x in CAIDA’s inferred topology [98],
we classified upstream links as vulnerable to Maestro if they were provider to customer links
where the To AS is 1) a direct/indirect provider of AS x and 2) within 3 topological hops
of AS x. We counted links as vulnerable to Crossfire if their simulated pre-attack bot-to-
any flow density was over 10%. We call this targeted flow density level the vulnerability
threshold. We averaged the results by the compromised AS’s UCLA classification [64]: stub
AS, small ISP, large ISP. Note Tier 1 networks are excluded from these results, as they are
not customers of any AS and thus cannot meaningfully execute Maestro. For this analysis,
we restrict our focus to core (above 7th decile betweenness) vulnerable links.
The results are displayed in Table 1. In the Maestro columns, we display the average
and standard deviation number of Maestro-vulnerable links for each AS classification. The
Crossfire columns show the same metrics for links with 10% flow densities without Maestro.
We find that in all AS classes, Maestro increases the pool of potential LFA targets
by at least 2x on average. Small ISPs have the greatest average number of Maestro-
vulnerable upstream links (40). This is consistent with our understanding of position-driven
vulnerability - small ISPs have, on average, more direct providers than stub ASes and a
greater number of provider hops to the Tier 1 clique than large ISPs. This means they
have the highest number of provider to customer links within 3 upstream hops, and thus the
largest pool of potential Maestro targets.
Strategic Adversary: The strategic adversary is motivated to attack specific links in
the topology. For this attacker, Maestro’s key capability is its ability to focus traffic on
specific upstream targets, including those isolated from LFA flows by topological constraints.
Because this attacker seeks to attack a specific link, we want to understand both the number
of ASes positioned to attack the target and the attack’s potency relative to existing LFAs.
For this analysis, we consider all links in the betweenness link sample set described in
Section 3.4.4, which contains randomly selected high, intermediate, and low betweenness
links. We analyze the results of the Maestro attack simulations from Section 3.4.4 and
determine the proportion of links over a given vulnerability threshold before and after attack
execution. The results are presented in Table 2. Less than 50% of these links have 25%
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or greater pre-attack flow density across all botnet models; after the attack,
greater than 95% of these links are above this threshold.
In addition to the attack effect, we also want to know how many ASes are positioned to
attack each link. The adversary sample set columns in Table 2 display, for each vulnerability
threshold, the average set size of potential ASes that an adversary could compromise to
perform the attack. To calculate this number, we first note that adversary AS size is not a
significant determinant of attack success - the absolute value of the correlation coefficient of
CAIDA AS rank [97] and flow density gain for these attacks was always smaller than .01.
Success for adversaries in the customer cone is instead dominated by relative topological
position. For this reason, if an AS two AS-level hops into the To AS customer cone
successfully executes Maestro at some threshold, we expect every other AS at the same
or closer depth to likewise succeed at that threshold.
Out of about 600 provider to customer attacks in this sample set, we found that fewer
than 3% violated this expectation for any botnet model. So, we estimate the potential
adversary pool as the To AS customer cone to the depth of the deepest successful adversary.
The standard deviation is also presented for these adversarial sets. Note that the high
variance in set size expressed by these statistics illustrates that the potential adversary pool
size varies greatly. For target links with large ISPs as the To AS (like core Internet links),
the To AS customer cone can include thousands of potential adversaries. For many smaller
targets, only a handful of ASes are well-positioned for the attack.
3.8 Towards Defenses
Two broad categories exist for defense against this attack: general LFA defense solutions
and solutions targeting poisoned announcements. Unfortunately, many state-of-the-art LFA
defense options are not widely available to network operators, as they require collaboration
across ASes [42], deployment of next-generation architectures [4], or additional hardware [34,
46, 68]. Nyx, a re-routing system [82] could only partially mitigate Maestro by moving traffic
between some critical AS and the Nyx deployer AS off the congested target. Here we consider
the more relevant mitigations that target Maestro’s poisoned advertisements.
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The path length defense - rejecting advertisements above some limit - is one easy-to-
implement response to this attack. Unfortunately, as shown in Fig. 12a, nearly all of the
attack effect is achieved with 5 or fewer poisons; this is partially an artifact of relatively dense
botnet distributions as discussed in the next mitigation. Tran et al. [96] observed AS PATH
lengths commonly reach 30 hops in legitimate advertisements, indicating that adding 5 hops
to the AS PATH is likely insufficient to distinguish attack advertisements. Fig. 12b shows
the impact if all ASes limited advertisement AS PATH length at various levels, including
those observed by prior work (30 and 75) [96] and implemented in common routing hardware
(254) [66]. These limits do not decrease achieved flow density.
An alternative defense involves detecting and suppressing poisoned BGP advertisements.
The current and potential effects of RPKI and BGPSec filtering is discussed in Section 2.4.
Alternatively, ASes could prevent Meastro by filtering all poisoned advertisements. This is
a feasible approach, because poisoned advertisements have a clear signature. However, as
previously discussed, this would prevent benign traffic engineering poisons. ASes are also
under unique administrative control, so uniform filter deployment is a challenge. Note that
the Peerlock leak defense system (see Chapter 4) will filter some poisoned advertisements as
deployed. However, deployments are limited to the largest ASes, and other inbound path
contorl techniques - like the NO EXPORT communities employed in the SICO attack [6] -
could be used in place of poisoning.
Fig. 12c shows how our betweenness-based link selection/customer only adversary
selection experiment responds to different sets of filtering ASes. For this mitigation trial,
we ran our attack against four filtering sets. The first two sets place poison filters at
25% and 50% of all transit ASes (those with one or more customers) filtering all poisoned
advertisements. The next two sets are smaller but more strategically targeted: filters at all
20 Tier 1 ASes (Hurricane Electric included) to explore how the best-provisioned networks
can protect the Internet as a whole, and botnet-specific defenses. The botnet-specific defense
springs from the observation that all three botnets in our study are highly concentrated. In
the Mirai model, for example, 64% of bots are hosted in just 30 ASes. So, for our final
filtering set, we include all providers (58) for these 30 ASes to cordon the botnet. While
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this filtering pattern is botnet-specific, it illustrates the efficient protection that few well-
positioned filterers provide relative to many randomly distributed ones. Both the 50%
transit and Mirai cordon filtering sets eliminate virtually all Maestro effect.
Interestingly, filtering at Tier 1s (20 ASes) provides greater overall protection than filtering
at 25% of transit providers (2441 ASes). This scenario is broader than the Peerlock protection
measured in 4, as Peerlock filters largely ignore non-Tier 1 poisons.
3.9 Related Work
The Coremelt [91] and Crossfire [35] attacks are discussed in detail in the background,
Section 3.2.1. Bellovin’s link cutting attack [5] discussed strategically cutting topological
links to route traffic through colluding ASes. While the purpose of that attack - interception
in the presence of path security - is different, the concept of severing links to re-route traffic
is similar. Classifying links by BGP betweenness is a technique employed in Schuchard
et al.’s Coordinated Cross Plane Session Termination (CXPST) control plane attack [74].
Select LFA mitigation work is presented in Section 3.8. Other uses of BGP poisoning include
LIFEGUARD from Katz-Bassett et al. [38, 39] as well as Colitti et al. and Anwar et al.’s
policy exploration studies [2, 14]. Nyx [82] from Smith et al. employs BGP poisoning for
DDoS mitigation. The propagation of poisoned advertisements throughout the Internet is




We submitted a preprint of the study behind this chapter to the NANOG (North American
Network Operators Group) mailing list to solicit feedback on the attack and disseminate
mitigations. Responses indicated that operators had not seen any similar attack executed
in practice. Some operators suggested that defensive filtering (a "peer lock" mechanism)
could provide some protection from the attack [84]. Peer locking validates advertisements
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against known relationships, an intuitive step in averting path manipulations like those used
in Maestro. However, this requires periodic out-of-band information exchange between ASes,
and there is little evidence that this feature has penetrated beyond Tier 1 ASes [55]. We
encountered some evidence of Tier 1 peer locking in Section 3.5, as did Smith et al. [80] in
their measurement study. Our Tier 1 filtering examination from Fig. 12c provides a window
into the effect of full Tier 1 peer locking.
In this chapter, we explored both LFA limitations and how adversaries can overcome
those limitations. Our experiments show that contrary to assumptions in previous literature,
botnet-sourced LFAs cannot target arbitrary links with full force in practice. In fact, many
core Internet links can be reached by just a fraction of infected hosts in all three of our botnet
models. Our simulations show the Maestro attack can partially overcome topological reach
restrictions. Most troublingly, high betweenness links are most vulnerable to this attack, and
the rank of AS adversaries plays little role in attack success. Provider to customer targets are
most vulnerable to Maestro, but other links with significantly infected From AS customer
cones can be affected by the attack. Additionally, the leak attack introduced here serves




Peerlock Route Leak Defense:
Measurement and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Internet consists of many ASes with distinct IP prefixes,
routing policies, and inter-AS connections. These networks exchange routes with neighboring
ASes over the control plane to connect hosts in disparate ASes and create the illusion for
users of a single, unified Internet. Unfortunately, there are few security controls on route
exchange. ASes behaving adversarially, whether intentionally (as in the prior chapter) or by
mistake, can export routes that should be kept internally or shared with only a subset of their
neighbors as shown in the prior chapter. Because the language ASes use to communicate -
BGP - does not package validation information with routes, remote networks often receive
and propagate these route leaks throughout the control plane. Leaks frequently steer user
traffic on the data plane onto unintended paths that lack capacity for the additional traffic.
The end result is soaring latency or complete availability loss for destination services.
Recent route leaks to prefixes hosting major content/service providers like Spotify [40],
Cloudflare [45] and Google [22] have highlighted the global impact of this problem.
Existing tools designed to curtail leaks, like the many Internet Routing Registries (IRRs),
are challenging to deploy or limited in scope. IRRs are databases where ASes can publish
their routing policies. Other ASes can then convert IRR-stored policies into filters to validate
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received routes. IRR-based filtering is limited by its requirement for broad AS participation,
however, as the motivations and sophistication of network operators varies greatly between
ASes [41]. Other BGP security extensions, like the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI), only enable filtering for a subset of leaks (e.g. re-origination leaks for RPKI).
We encountered selective filtering of poisoned BGP updates in our proof-of-concept live
Internet "attacks" in Chapter 3. Given the relative rarity of poison filtering observed in
prior work [81] and the broad use of poisoning as a primitive in attacks, measurements,
and defensive systems [2, 54, 6, 39, 82], we sought to uncover the design and placement of
these filters within the control plane. As we will show in this chapter, our poisoned attack
advertisements were likely arrested by new systems deployed to mitigate route leaks.
The Peerlock [83, 84] leak defense system was presented in 2016 to address the need
for a deployable leak mitigation solution. Each Peerlock deployment occurs between two
neighboring ASes, the protector AS and protected AS. The protector AS agrees to filter
routes that transit the protected AS unless they arrive directly from the protected AS or
one of its designated upstreams. The filter prevents the protector AS from propagating
or steering its traffic onto any leaked route that transits the protected AS, regardless of
origin AS/destination prefix. Peerlock is designed to leverage the rich web of relationships
that exist between transit networks in the Internet’s core, and functions without coordination
with other ASes on potential leak paths. This makes Peerlock especially viable in the peering
clique formed by the 19 Tier 1 ASes that sit atop the inter-domain routing hierarchy. A
related technique, Peerlock-lite, enables networks to spot likely leaks without prior out-of-
band communication. ASes deploying Peerlock-lite drop routes arriving from customers that
contain a Tier 1 AS; it is highly improbable that customers are providing transit for large
global networks.
Our first contribution is a measurement of Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployment on the
control plane. In Section 4.4 we design, execute, and evaluate active Internet measurements
to search for evidence of filtering consistent with these systems. Our experiments use BGP
poisoning, a technique used in prior work for traffic engineering [82] and path discovery [2], to
mimic route leaks that transit some target AS. We then listen for which networks propagate
- or filter - these "leaks" relative to control advertisements. This information feeds several
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inference techniques designed to uncover which ASes are Peerlocking for (protecting) the
target AS.
Notably, we find substantial Peerlock deployment within the peering clique: about 48%
of possible filtering rules (153/342) are already implemented within this set. Further, many
non-Tier 1 ASes - including nearly 40% of large ISPs observed during our experiments -
perform some Peerlock-lite filtering on Tier 1 AS leaks. Evidence for Peerlock filtering of
non-Tier 1 leaks is virtually nonexistent, though three Tier 1 networks (AS 12956, AS 2914,
and AS 3320) each filter leaks for more than 20 non-Tier 1 ASes.
After detecting current Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployments, we ask how well these
systems mitigate Tier 1 leaks. Internet-scale BGP simulations in Section 4.5 test over 6,000
simulated Tier 1 leaks against observed Peerlock/Peerlock-lite levels to quantify the effect
of these systems as deployed. We test the same leaks against six hypothetical extended
deployment scenarios to understand where additional filters should be placed to isolate leaks.
We find that Peerlock filtering within the peering clique is helpful, but not sufficient to
mitigate Tier 1 route leaks on its own. Consistent with prior work on BGP filtering [18], our
experiments show that positioning filters at relatively few ASes - the roughly 600 large ISPs
- can play a decisive role in leak prevention. About 80% of simulated leaks were completely
mitigated by uniform Peerlock-lite filter deployment at large ISPs, with fewer than 10%
of leaks spreading beyond 10% of the topology. These figures are especially encouraging
because Peerlock-lite is based on a simple route validity check informed by the valley-free
routing model [17] that requires no out-of-band communication.
In this chapter, we make the following key contributions:
• We give an overview of the Peerlock and Peerlock-lite filtering systems, and consider
their benefits and limitations relative to existing tools in Section 4.3.
• We describe how we adapt existing Internet measurement techniques to probe
Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployment on the control plane and introduce a novel inference
method in Section 4.4.
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• We actively measure where Peerlock and Peerlock-lite filters are deployed with
PEERING [73] and CAIDA’s BGPStream [65] in Section 4.4.2, with a discussion of
results in Section 4.4.3.
• We simulate thousands of Tier 1 route leaks against several protection scenarios in
Section 4.5.2, and present a new path encoding method to understand how these
scenarios influence leak propagation and export in Section 4.5.3.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Route Leak Prevention
There are a number of tools available to assist network operators in preventing route leaks.
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure [43] is a trusted repository for certificates that
bind IP prefixes to owning ASes’s public keys, called Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).
Remote networks can validate BGP updates against ROAs in the RPKI, a process called
Route Origin Validation (ROV). Widespread ROV filtering could prevent Type 5 leaks and
many prefix hijacking attacks. Unfortunately, ROA/ROV deployment has suffered from
circular deployment logic; it is meaningless for origin ASes to invest in publishing ROAs
until ROV is widely implemented, but ROV is ineffective without ROAs. This issue has
been identified as a major obstacle to ROV deployment [18, 26]. NIST estimates that just
21% of prefixes are covered by a valid ROA [62].
Internet routing registries (IRRs) back another leak prevention system. IRRs are
databases where AS operators can store their routing policies. Remote networks can ingest
these policies to inform filters that block unintended/invalid advertisements. IRR databases
are operated by private firms, regional Internet registries, and other interests [56], and policy
entries are often mirrored between them. A complete, up-to-date IRR would eliminate many
Type 1-4 route leaks. Like ROV filtering, though, IRR filtering is hampered by deployment
headaches. ASes’ routing policies are interdependent, so changes to one network’s stored
policies can render many others obsolete. Operators in smaller, resource-limited networks
can avoid periodic updates by configuring permissive routing policies; large transit ASes
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have complex, dynamic routing policies that require frequent changes to dependent networks’
filters [41]. These issues, combined with poor or non-existent authentication, have resulted
in inconsistent and out-of-date IRRs. Though leading organizations like RIPE have launched
efforts to improve IRR quality [70], operator incentive and dependency issues will continue
to limit their usefulness.
Other filtering techniques include max-prefix limit filtering, where a network caps the
number of prefixes it will accept from a neighbor. This prevents mass prefix spills like
the 2017 Level 3 leak [50], but not more targeted (yet highly disruptive) leaks like the
Verizon/Cloudflare incident described earlier. BGPSec [44] is a protocol extension for
cryptographic AS path hardening. This would prevent some types of hijacking, but BGPSec
has not been commercially implemented and is not designed to prevent route leaks.
A communities-based "down-only" (DO) leak solution has also been proposed [87]. Large
BGP communities [85] are signals containing three integers that can be attached to routes.
The DO system relies on providers/peers marking a route "down-only" using the first two
integers in a large community, with their ASN included as the third integer, before passing
the route to customers or peers. If these customers/peers attempt to re-advertise the route
to other providers/peers, the attached DO community will clearly signal a route leak. While
this system would prevent many leaks if properly implemented, it relies on customers/peers
preserving DO information when propagating advertisements. Moreover, some leaks - like
the internal route leaks in the Verizon/Cloudflare incident - would not be arrested by this
system.
Finally, Peerlock/Peerlock-lite are designed to detect Type 1-4 route leaks by applying
out-of-band information about the ASes on an advertised path. These systems are explored
in great detail in this chapter.
4.3 The Peerlock System
The challenge of leak filtering stems from the topological scope asymmetry between BGP
routes and the perspective of individual AS operators who evaluate them. Routes span the
topology (global scope); operators only know their own relationships with adjoining ASes
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(local scope). Filtering systems built on the RPKI [29] and IRRs [61] partially address this
asymmetry by applying additional information to the route evaluation process. However,
these existing solutions have limitations that have hamstrung their deployment. Most
critically, their effectiveness depends on the cooperation of many unincentivized remote ASes
as detailed in Section 4.2.
4.3.1 Peerlock
Peerlock, first detailed by NTT in 2016 [83, 84], is a leak filtering scheme based on out-of-
band information exchange between BGP neighbors. Peerlock requires a single AS (the
protected AS ) to designate authorized upstreams to their BGP neighbor (the protector
AS ). This communication distributes AS relationship information between peers to decrease
route/filterer scope asymmetry. The protector AS then rejects any BGP update whose AS
PATH contains the protected AS unless received 1) directly from the protected AS, or 2)
from an authorized upstream, with the protected AS immediately following the authorized
upstream in the AS PATH. We say that the protector AS is Peerlocking for the protected
AS. See Fig. 13 for a depiction of the system. In this chapter, we will often refer to a single
instance of Peerlock - that is, one protector/protected pairing - as a Peerlock rule.
Here we describe Peerlock’s benefits and drawbacks relative to previous leak prevention
systems, each of which is described in detail in Section 4.2. These comparisons are
summarized in Table A.
RPKI/ROV Comparison: Peerlock provides broader leak type coverage than RPKI/ROV
filtering without a trust infrastructure requirement. However, Peerlock only applies to leaks
that violate configured topological rules (Types 1-4), so Type 5 (re-origination) and Type
6 (internal route) leaks fall outside its scope. ROAs tie prefixes to valid originating ASes,
so ROV filtering can prevent Type 5 leaks. Additionally, ROAs can be configured with a
max prefix length to prevent some internal route leaks and hijacks, although recent work has
identified vulnerabilities in this feature [19]. Because Peerlock and RPKI/ROV filtering cover
different leak types, Peerlock is complementary to ROV filtering rather than a replacement.
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IRR Comparison: IRRs are policy object databases capable of storing participating
networks’ routing intentions with great detail and fine granularity (prefix level). Any AS
wishing to enforce these intentions can automatically derive filters from stored objects
using software tools, whereas Peerlock rule configuration requires setup between each
protector/protected AS pair. Unfortunately, IRRs suffer from incentive misalignment,
governance, and rule dependency issues as described in Section 4.2. Peerlock rules are self-
contained, and changes do not affect other rules. This encapsulation avoids the cascading
dependency problem exhibited by IRRs, where one AS’s policy changes may render many
other AS’s entries obsolete.
Most importantly, Peerlock allows the protector AS to stop leaks that transit the
protected network regardless of the actions of ASes along potential leak paths; the value
of IRR-based filters depends on many remote networks to store accurate policy entries.
Peerlock’s relatively light cooperation requirement only requires that ASes with an existing
relationship communicate information between themselves. This dynamic enables the best
resourced, positioned, and incentivized networks (i.e., those serving the most customers) to
block route leak propagation regardless of other remote networks’ actions.
Max Prefix Comparison: BGP’s max prefix feature enables networks to limit the number
of prefixes they will accept over each neighboring AS connection. Mass route leaks - those
involving many prefixes - are filtered once prefix volume over an inter-AS link exceeds the
preset limit. Max prefix filtering affords broad protection across leak types, but cannot
stop leaks involving few (potentially critical/highly trafficked) prefixes. On the other hand,
Peerlock cannot stop leaks that do not violate established topological constraints regardless
of volume, but is effective against more selective leaks unprotected by max prefix limits.
Other Considerations: Currently, each Peerlock rule must be manually configured,
although at least one method has been proposed to automate Peerlock [30]. Peerlock also
lacks a standard to describe how out-of-band information is exchanged between participants.
Without a detailed and secure protocol for rule configuration, Peerlock is vulnerable to
exploitation; fraudulent rules affect route export, and could be used to engineer traffic flows.
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Furthermore, operators must define their own ad-hoc protocols for communicating rules that
may not guarantee authenticity and/or confidentiality. Virtually all leak solutions discussed
here, including IRR, RPKI/ROV, and AS PATH filtering, are recommended by the best
practices group Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) [57].
4.3.2 Peerlock-lite
Peerlock-lite [84] (or Tier 1 filter, "big networks" filter) is a related technique, based on the
assumption that transit providers should never receive a route whose AS PATH includes
a Tier 1 AS from a customer. This is a valid assumption under the valley-free routing
model [17], because such an update implies the customer is providing transit for the Tier 1
AS; otherwise, the customer would not export (leak) the route to another provider. However,
Tier 1 ASes have no providers by definition. This logic can be extended heuristically to any
other large non-Tier 1 networks that the provider does not expect the customer to export.
This simple logic yields an equally simple filtering rule for transit providers - reject any
updates from customers that contain a Tier 1/large transit ASN. See Fig. 14 for a depiction
of this filtering technique. Peerlock-lite filters are limited to Tier 1/large transit provider
leaks, but they require no out-of-band information to configure. Moreover, Tier 1 ASes’
position at the Internet’s core results in their frequent presence on AS PATHs of highly
disruptive leaks, e.g. the Verizon/Cloudflare leak [45] and the Enzu/AWS/Spotify leak [40].
4.4 Measuring Peerlock Deployment
Our initial experiments seek to establish the current state of Peerlock deployment on the
control plane. As discussed in the previous section, every Peerlock rule is configured between
a pair of networks: the protector AS and the protected AS. Each of the experiments in this




Each set of measurement experiments in this section is designed to discover Peerlock rules
for a set of potential protected ASes, called target ASes. For each target AS, we advertise
a /24 prefix from many points-of-presence (PoPs) on the control plane. This is the control
advertisement. It is a normal /24 origination in every way, except that our university AS
- which we know not to be protected by any Peerlock rule - is poisoned (i.e., prepended to
the advertisement’s AS PATH - see Section 2.4). We then listen at varied collection sites,
called collectors, for BGP updates triggered by our advertisement. The AS PATH for each
such update that arrives at collectors lists in encounter order the ASes that received and
re-issued the update as described in Section 2.1.
Taken together, the gathered AS PATHs form a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that
describes the control advertisement’s propagation through the control plane; each AS
appearing on at least one AS PATH forms a node in the DAG, and AS ordering within
paths allows us to form directed edges between nodes. BGP loop detection prevents cycles
as noted in Section 2.4. We call this graph the control DAG. Note that all of the ASes
appearing in the control DAG propagated (and thus did not filter) control updates that
include a poisoned AS.
We then wait 30 minutes for update propagation before issuing an explicit withdrawal
for the /24 prefix. This timing is built conservatively from empirical measurements
of propagation times through the control plane (see update propagation experiments
in appendix). After another waiting period to ensure the withdrawal has completely
propagated, we issue a leak advertisement for the same /24 prefix. This advertisement
matches the control advertisement in every way, except that the target AS is poisoned. This
leak advertisement structure is designed to mimic a leak for the purposes of Peerlock while
avoiding other common filtering systems. The target AS’s presence on update paths triggers
filtering for any Peerlock protector ASes.
Finally, we gather all BGP updates for the leak advertisement from our collectors. The
ASes that appear on AS PATHs in any of these updates are added to a set called the leak set.
41
Since they propagated poisoned updates, we know these ASes did not filter the "leak". With
the control DAG and leak set together, we can reason about which ASes are Peerlocking for
the target AS using two techniques: 1) clique inference and 2) DAG inference.
For detecting Tier 1 protector ASes, we use clique inference. This simple technique relies
on the fact that Tier 1 ASes form a peering clique by definition. According to the valley-
free routing model [17], ASes share all updates received from customers with their peers;
this maximizes the traffic the AS transits for its customers (and thus the AS operator’s
compensation). Further, ASes should not share a peer’s updates with another peer, as this
is a Type 2 route leak [86]. So, in general, if a Tier 1 AS is observed propagating an update,
all Tier 1s should receive the update via their peering relationships. Because we observe at
least one Tier 1 propagating control and leak updates across all experiments, we define a
simple rule for inferring Tier 1 protector ASes: any Tier 1 AS that appears in the control
DAG but not the leak set is Peerlocking for the target AS.
Inferring other protector ASes requires a more general technique. Outside the structural
guarantees provided by the Tier 1 clique, there is significantly more uncertainty about
which networks are filtering leak updates. Specifically, it is difficult to distinguish an
AS filtering updates from an AS not receiving updates at all due to filtering by other
upstream/downstream networks. This challenge leads us to make three separate inferences
for these ASes for each leak target.
First and simplest is the max inference set, defined as all control DAG ASes minus the
leak set. This set includes all ASes who may have filtered leak updates, but also ASes who
did not receive the leak update because it was filtered by an intermediate AS. Secondly, we
build amin inference set. This set is built by deleting all leak set ASes from the control DAG,
and collecting the root of every weakly connected component that remains. This isolates
the ASes that filtered leak updates from ASes in their "shadow" who did not receive the
updates. The min inference set contains those ASes who likely filtered leak updates based
on routes we observed. Note that the min/max inference techniques closely align with those
employed in the long path filtering experiments in Smith et al.’s study on BGP poisoning as
a re-routing primitive [81].
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Our last inference set is the likely inference. Because ASes only export their best path to
our /24 prefix, we cannot observe every edge that should exist in the control DAG (i.e., every
potential propagation path for updates). So, this set’s is built like the min inference set,
except that we augment the control DAG with edges from CAIDA’s provider-peer observed
customer cone inference [98]. That is, we add edges to the control DAG where CAIDA’s
data indicates there are links between ASes that we did not observe due to policy decisions.
This forms a superset of the min inference set and a subset of the max inference set that
contains the most likely filterers. This is a novel technique not used to our knowledge in any
prior work on this topic.
These three inference sets are formed for each target from differences in control and leak
update propagation. In addition to these sets, we also build a min/max/likely poison filtering
set by following the same steps listed above, but with a unpoisoned advertisement ’s updates
compared against the control advertisement’s updates. These sets are built to explore the
prevalence of general poison filtering as in Smith et al. [81].
Framework Details
The control-plane measurement framework for these experiments consists of 1) 13 PoPs to
issue BGP advertisements and 2) 54 BGP collectors to listen for propagation. We employ
the PEERING testbed [73] for the first requirement. PEERING allows us to advertise
three assigned /24 prefixes from edge routers at thirteen PoPs worldwide. For collecting
BGP updates, we used CAIDA’s BGPStream [98] tool. This tool draws updates from 54
globally distributed collectors, including 30 RouteViews [99] and 24 RIPE RIS [59] collectors.
While most of these collectors are positioned in North America and Europe, every populated
continent is represented by at least one collector.
Measurement Limitations
While our framework allows us to effectively probe the control plane for evidence of Peerlock
and related techniques, a number of limitations prevent complete certainty regarding
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Peerlock filter placement. The most important of these obstacles are imperfect collector
coverage, topological instability, and the presence of other filtering systems. Here we discuss
each of these factors in turn.
BGP policies prohibit us from viewing the entirety of the topology with our framework;
there are few collectors in stub networks, and stub/remote ASes do not export received
updates back "up" through provider networks. This means our observation window - the
ASes on update paths at collectors - is biased toward transit networks in the Internet’s core
as in [64]. Fortunately, this is the most important/influential region to monitor, as these
network’s policies have the widest impact on the control plane. Altogether, we observed
610 ASes during our experiments, including 181/605 large ISPs and all 19 Tier 1 networks.
Most observed ASes (332) were present in the observation window during all experiments
conducted from August 2019-May 2020. Note that while we can only infer protector ASes
from our observation window, we can poison any AS. So, our window does not limit our
inference regarding which ASes are protected.
To account for instability in our observation window, we limit our filtering inferences
to those ASes observed in control updates both before and after the leak advertisement
(i.e., for the current and next target AS experiment). Additionally, we repeat experiments
- issue control/leak advertisements for the same target ASes - over several months. These
observations are combined to reduce the "noise" of topological dynamism from our inferences.
Specifically, we remove ASes from a target’s filtering inference sets if we later observe them
propagating a leak update for that target; in this case, the earlier inference was likely caused
by the AS’s intermittent presence in the observation window during the experiment.
Most importantly, we acknowledge that we cannot be certain Peerlock/Peerlock-lite
exactly as described by NTT [83, 84] is responsible for all observed filtering, but our
experiments are designed to avoid common leak filtering systems. First, since the leak and
control advertisements in our experiments share an origin AS/prefix, their updates present
identically for ROV filtering purposes. Additionally, since we observe all ASes in the control
DAG propagating control updates, we infer those ASes will not apply common IRR or max-
prefix limit filtering to the same /24 in leak updates. Finally, while prior work indicates that
short poisoned paths are frequently present on the control plane [96] and rarely filtered [81],
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the poisoning in the control advertisement ensures that we do not conflate poison filtering
and Peerlocking.
Despite our efforts to avoid common filtering practices, local policies grant network
operators extensive discretion in how routes are vetted and exported. This flexibility means
we cannot be certain that experimental updates are not sometimes blocked by AS specific,
ad-hoc AS PATH filtering techniques. We know of no way to distinguish such functionally
similar filters from Peerlock.
Ethics
We issued only well-formed BGP advertisements using the PEERING software client and
adhered to all rules published by PEERING. We advertised only our assigned /24 prefixes,
which are reserved for experimental use, and thus did not disturb Internet control or
data plane operation for any non-experimental IP addresses. Our experiments did require
poisoned advertisements, but this is a common practice used both in research [6, 81] and in
traffic engineering [96]. One network operator observed and inquired about our experiments
to PEERING, but did not report any resultant adverse effects. No data-plane traffic was
sent during the conduct of our experiments.
4.4.2 Evaluation
Target Set 1, Tier 1s
The 19 Tier 1 ASes form our first target AS set, i.e. the potential protected ASes for which
we are inferring Peerlock rules. The Tier 1 peering clique includes the most influential
networks by one of the few observable metrics, customer cone size [98], and often creates [50]
or distributes [45, 22, 78] leaks that disrupt global Internet services. Paradoxically, deploying
filters for leaks that include Tier 1 ASes is also relatively simple for non-Tier 1 networks via
the Peerlock-lite system described above. We iteratively issued unpoisoned, control, and leak
advertisements that covered this set (repeated our measurements) every two months from
August 2019 to May 2020. This repetition allows us to capture filtering rules for ASes with
45
inconsistent presence in our observation window, and to explore how deployments change
over time.
We first present results for protection within the Tier 1 clique in Fig. 16. Note that
because of BGP loop detection, every AS filters leak updates that include their own ASN
regardless of Peerlock deployment. The peering clique is fortunately the most stable feature
in our observation window, enabling us to measure the presence/absence of nearly every
potential Peerlock rule within the clique. We have marked the exceptions for which we were
unable to measure filtering rules in pink in Fig. 16. We see that Peerlock deployment is
significant but unevenly distributed within the clique. Some ASes - e.g. AS 2914 NTT, AS
701 Verizon - filter leak updates for virtually the entire clique. For five others - e.g. AS 3491
PCCW Global, AS 6762 Telecom Italia - we found no evidence of Tier 1 Peerlock filtering
at all.
Our measurement results for Peerlock/Peerlock-lite protection of Tier 1s by all observed
ASes are depicted in Fig. 17. Fig 17a shows both our inferences about which networks filter
poisoned updates in general (blue lines) and which filter Tier 1 leaks (red lines). These are
displayed as a cumulative distribution function (CDF) over Tier 1 targets; likely inferred
filtering levels range from about 3% (AS 6830) to 15% (AS 701) of observed ASes. Note that
per the experimental design described above, we cannot make Peerlock protection inferences
for ASes filtering all poisoned updates; however, this is a small set without Tier 1/large ISP
members (max inference size = 9 ASes). Fig. 17 shows the number of ASes in each UCLA
class (see Section 3.2) protecting at least one Tier 1 target.
Target Set 2, Tier 1 Peers
Our second target set includes the non-Tier 1 peers of Tier 1 ASes (about 600 ASes) as
inferred by CAIDA [98]. These experiments explore whether Tier 1 ASes are extending
Peerlock protection to their non-Tier 1 peers. Additionally, despite covering about 1% of
all ASes, this set includes a third of all large ISPs. The presence of these large ISPs in the
target set allows us to investigate whether non-Tier 1 ASes apply Peerlock-lite filters to large
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transit networks outside the peering clique. These experiments were conducted from Oct
2019 to May 2020, with every included network targeted at least twice.
The overall results are presented in Fig. 18a. Clearly, filtering for these leaks is less
prevalent within our observation window. 80% of Tier 1 peer leaks were filtered by
fewer than 2% of observed ASes, but a few exceptional targets did trigger significant filtering
behavior. Our poison filtering inference for these targets is, as expected, nearly identical to
that derived from the Tier 1 leak experiments. Fig. 18b displays filtering levels for each Tier
1 ASes by peering status with the target. All Tier 1s protect 10 or fewer peer networks
from this set. More variance exists in non-peer filtering behavior, as we will explore in the
following discussion.
4.4.3 Discussion
Consistent with Smith et al. [81], we find no evidence for widespread filtering of otherwise
unremarkable poisoned paths. Their study also found that poisoning high degree ASes in an
update is associated with reduced propagation. Specifically, sub-20% update propagation
rates were observed for some Tier 1 ASes, including AS 174 (Cogent/Tier 1) and AS
3356 (Level 3/Tier 1). Birge-Lee et al. [6] likewise found that using AS poisoning
rather than communities as a path export control primitive significantly reduced update
spread, especially when large transit providers were poisoned. Defensive AS-path filtering
(e.g.,Peerlock/Peerlock-lite) is identified as a likely culprit for this effect. Our work
systematically examines how and where these filters are deployed on the control plane (within
the limits of our observation window).
Tier 1 Leak Filtering
The greatest protection within our observation window is clearly afforded to Tier 1 ASes. Our
initial experiments in August 2019 discovered evidence for 133/342 (192 − 19) possible Tier
1-Tier 1 filtering rules (about 39%). Each measurement that followed uncovered at least two
new filtering rules, and by our final experiment in May 2020, 153 rules had been observed, a
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nearly 15% uptick in Peerlock deployment. We had previously observed a negative filtering
result for every additional rule, indicating this increase results from genuinely new Peerlock
deployments rather than instability in the observation window.
Non-Tier 1 ASes also filter Tier 1 leaks, though this behavior is far from uniform. Overall,
Tier 1 leak filtering ranged from 3% to 15% of observed ASes across Tier 1 AS targets. Most
of this is likely due to Peerlock-lite filtering, as it is simpler to deploy. Moreover, fewer
than 10% of the more than 1,000 observed Tier 1 filtering rules exist between peers, and
only about 20% (236 rules) involved a Tier 1’s indirect customers filtering leak updates.
This suggests that ASes are installing Peerlock-lite filters for all Tier 1s rather than simply
protecting their upstream providers.
Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) [58] is an initiative whose ISP
members agree to best routing practices (like AS path filtering) to secure inter-domain
routing. While Peerlock and Peerlock-lite are not specifically included in MANRS expected
filtering actions, they are both suggested in the implementation guide [57]. Fig.19 displays
as a CDF the proportion of MANRS and non-MANRS ASes filtering Tier 1 leaks. 73 of
502 MANRS ASes fall within our observation window; the proportion of observed MANRS
ASes that filtered Tier 1 leaks ranged from 2-18% depending on Tier 1 target. Non-MANRS
filtering over the same target set ranged from 2 to 12%.
As shown in Fig 17b, the proportion of ASes with Tier 1 leak filters rises with
UCLA class [64]. Intuitively, networks with larger customer cones have the resources for
sophisticated configurations and the imperative to prevent issues for downstream customers,
and have previously been associated with differing responses to BGP events [81, 7]. This
dynamic hampers systems requiring wide participation like ROV [18] and IRR filtering [41],
but does not limit Peerlock or Peerlock-lite deployment.
Tier 1 Peer Leak Filtering
Our non-Tier 1 leak experiments met with relatively sporadic filtering. For more than
80% of targets in this set, nearly every observation window AS (>=98%) propagated leaks.
As described in Section 4.3, Peerlock-lite filters for non-Tier 1 ASes require more careful
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deployment. The outliers in this target set (see the long tail in Fig. 18a) are invariably near-
Tier 1 networks like AS 1273 Vodafone, AS 6939 Hurricane Electric, and AS 7843 Charter
that are safe for most ASes to include in a Peerlock-lite filter.
Tier 1 filtering of this leak set was likewise reduced compared to Tier 1 leaks. In general,
Tier 1 networks deploy fewer than 5 Peerlock filters for non-clique peers. Nearly all of these
cover near-Tier 1s like AS 7922 Comcast and AS 1273 Vodafone, or ASes administered by
Tier 1s e.g. AS 702/703 Verizon and AS 3549 Level 3. Notably, three networks extend
protection to more than 15 non-peers (per CAIDA’s inference). AS 2914 NTT’s non-peer
filtering rules all cover various Comcast ASNs, while AS 12956 Telefonica’s rules appear to
be regionally-based: zero rules are applied to customer cone ASes, but 23/31 apply to other
European ISPs of varying size. 13/20 of AS 3320 Deutsche Telecom’s non-peer filtering rules,
on the other hand, cover ASes within its customer cone.
In summary, Peerlock is widely deployed and expanding within the peering clique.
Deployment outside the peering clique is relatively limited, however. Up to 20% of non-
clique networks also deploy Peerlock-lite (or a similar mechanism) to filter leaks containing
Tier 1 or near-Tier 1 ASes. These deployments are proportionally more common in ISPs
and rarely seen in stub ASes within our observation window. Fortunately, the effectiveness
of Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployments is less sensitive to scattershot deployment than other
filtering solutions. Prior work [18] and our simulations in the following Section 4.5 suggest
that filtering by large ISPs can have an outsize impact on global leak propagation.
4.5 Exploring Peerlock’s Practical Impact
The substantial but limited Peerlock/Peerlock-lite filtering measured in the previous section
leads us to investigate these systems’ protective benefit in partial deployment. We have
interest both in how well these systems protect the control plane from Tier 1 leaks as
deployed, and in the relative effect of realistic additional deployment (e.g. adding filters at
large transit networks). To answer these questions, we quantify Peerlock’s practical impact
with Internet-scale leak simulations against several filter deployment schemes.
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4.5.1 Simulation Methodology
These experiments are conducted via extensions to a BGP simulator, an approach consistent
with prior work on this topic [74, 75, 82, 96]. We construct a simulated AS-level topology
from CAIDA’s inferred relationship dataset (Jan. 2020 data) [98]. ASes within the topology
evaluate and export routes using the BGP decision process; longest-prefix matching, LOCAL
PREF, and AS PATH guide path selection, while route export is governed by local policy to
enforce valley-free routing. This ensures the simulator models the central dynamic of control
plane propagation - the Gao-Rexford model [17], and allows for the closest approximation
of control plane behavior we can devise without ASes’ full (private) routing policies.
Each simulation is driven by a protection scenario that maps protector ASes to those
they are protecting. As with Peerlock in practice, these protectors drop all received routes
that transit a protected AS unless they arrive directly from that AS. Some scenarios also
include Peerlock-lite deployments; for these experiments, some set of ASes filter all customer-
exported routes that transit Tier 1 ASes. Once we establish the protection scenario, we
iterate over all Tier 1 to Tier 1 links (with 19 Tier 1 ASes, this is n = 19, n2 − n = 342
links). These links describe a unidirectional connection from one Tier 1, called the link start,
to another Tier 1, called the link end.
For every link in this set, we sample 20 ASes from the link start’s customer cone to
serve as leakers. Each leaker will, in turn, randomly select a destination AS in the link
end’s customer cone, and advertise a route to the destination over the link to all of its
peers/providers (see Fig. 20). This models a Type 1 route leak of a path over the peering
clique [86]. After the leak, we allow the topology to converge and measure how many ASes
1) received leak updates and 2) installed the leak path. Additionally, we capture all the AS
PATH of all leak updates for analysis. With 20 leaker/destination pairings per link and 342
Tier 1 links, we simulate 6,840 leaks in total.
Our simulations focus on leaks with Tier 1 leaks for two reasons. First, we do not
find substantial real-world Peerlock/Peerlock-lite protection of non-Tier 1 ASes as outlined
in Section 4.4. Second, many consequential leaks are propagated globally over the Tier 1
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backbone, e.g. [50, 45, 78, 22]. Some of our protection schemes will investigate whether leaks
can propagate throughout the Internet without Tier 1 distribution.
4.5.2 Evaluation
We evaluate seven different protection schemes for Tier 1 leaks.
• No filters.
• Inferred: Tier 1 Peerlock levels observed during Internet measurements.
• Full T1: All Tier 1s Peerlock for all other Tier 1s.
• Full T1 + large ISP lock: Same as full T1, but all large ISPs Peerlock their Tier 1
peers.
• Full T1 + large ISP lite: Same as full T1, but all large ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite to
protect clique ASes.
• Full T1 + large ISP both: Same as full T1, but all large ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite
filters and Peerlock for their Tier 1 peers.
• Inferred + large ISP lite: Same as inferred, but all large ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite.
While it is simpler to filter customer-learned routes with Peerlock-lite than to deploy Tier 1
Peerlock filters for large ISPs, we include both Peerlock and Peerlock-lite filtering by these
ASes to study how leaks are propagated within the topology. The results of these experiments
are presented in Fig. 21, which displays both the proportion of ASes in the topology receiving
leak updates (Fig. 21a), and the proportion selecting/exporting the leak path (Fig. 21b).
A critical feature revealed by Fig. 21 is the insufficiency of Tier 1 protection alone (blue
lines). Full Tier 1 Peerlocking prevents all distribution of studied leaks over the peering
clique, but leak updates still spread to the majority of the topology for most experiments.
Adding large ISP Peerlock protection has a relatively significant impact on both propagation
and installation.
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Peerlock-lite deployment by these ASes (red lines) benefits from more filterers with wider
protection per filterer. Naturally, these scenarios are much more effective at preventing
propagation. For most leak cases, less than 10% of the topology receives leak updates.
This highlights the leverage large ISPs have within the topology; filtering at these ASes
(<1% of all networks) generates an extensive shielding effect. The distinct "shoulder" on
the Peerlock-lite curves in Fig. 21b suggests the impact on ASes using the leak is even more
pronounced. There is virtually no impact on target link usage for 75% of simulated leaks
when Peerlock-lite is deployed by all large ISPs. Interestingly, the combination of Peerlock
and Peerlock-lite filtering by large ISPs (green line) adds little value over Peerlock-lite alone.
4.5.3 Discussion
Path Encoding
To analyze how each of these scenarios shapes leak propagation (and route selection/export),
we collect the AS PATH of all leaks exported during the above experiments. We use a novel
path encoding whereby each AS on leak AS PATHs is converted to a 2-tuple with the form
(relationship to next AS, UCLA class [64]). Only the AS PATH segment from the first
customer to provider link to the leaker ASN - the leak segment - is encoded. This trimming
discards the "down" segment prepended as leaks propagate within customer cones, as well
as the the segment connecting leaker and destination that is invariant across leaks. We
include AS relationship in the encoding because of its importance in path export behavior
as described in Section 2.1; UCLA class informs us regarding where leaks travel through the
routing hierarchy. Taken together, these factors help us understand broadly the topological
dynamics at play in leak propagation, and to capture the dominant leak propagation vectors
under each protection scenario.
Relationship is encoded as "C" (customer), "R" (peer), or "P" (provider). UCLA classes
are indicated by "T" (Tier 1), "L" (large ISP), "S" (small ISP), and "U" (stub). Example:
[LR, TP] encodes a leak path exported to a Tier 1 provider by the leaker, who then passes
the leak to a large ISP peer. The progress of the leak through the large ISP’s customer cone
52
would continue to the left of "LR", and the path from leaker to destination would continue
to the right of "TP", but these segments are omitted as explained above.
We will use two tables in analyzing our results. Table A depicts the three most common
leak encodings for each scenario; these account for at least a quarter of leak paths regardless
of filter placement. We also list the sum and percentage of ASes exporting leaks accounted
for by each encoding. Table A gives summary statistics for leak segments, including their
average length and the percentage of leak segments transiting each UCLA class. Because we
do not encode customer cone propagation in leak segments, stubs are transited in <10% of
paths across all protection scenarios, are are omitted from the table.
First, we observe that even under the "no filters" scenario, leaks re-transiting the Tier 1
clique are not the most common path encoding in Table A. Table A shows they are present
in fewer than 35% of leak segments under all scenarios. This result is an artifact of the BGP
decision process; paths learned from customers are preferred over those exported by peers,
and peer routes are favored over provider-learned ones. So, with all other selection criteria
equal, routes exported from providers "above" an AS in the topology - e.g. the peering
clique - will generally only be installed and exported if the AS has not received an update
from peers/customers "below". Since Tier 1 providers cap the routing hierarchy, we expect
ASes will prefer non-Tier 1 routes when provided alternatives by their connectivity. This
dynamic explains why the additional protection afforded by complete Peerlock within the
peering clique vs. current levels is muted in Fig. 21b.
This effect also brings large ISPs to the fore in our simulations. As noted in [64], these
networks are densely connected with peering links. Their connectivity allows them to bypass
the Tier 1 clique for many routes - and makes them the primary channel for leak propagation.
The most common encoding for every scenario in Table A includes a large ISP, and 18/21
of the top encodings transit at least one. More than 70% of leak segments transit these
ASes for all protection scenarios (see Table A). In fact, in the scenarios without Peerlock-lite
(top four listed), leak segments on average transit - and could be filtered by - multiple large
ISPs. These statistics motivate the scenarios that place Peerlock-lite filtering at these ASes
(bottom three in tables).
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Interestingly, Peerlock-lite diminishes leak usage and propagation unequally as shown
in Fig. 21. Fig. 21a shows about 20% of leak segments propagate to 20% or more of the
topology with large ISP Peerlock-lite deployment, but Fig. 21b shows that fewer than 5%
are installed/exported by at least 20% of ASes. Table A hints at why this is the case - a
third or more of leak segments in Peerlock-lite scenarios are exported to large ISP peers, who
propagate them directly into their customer cones (indicated by [LR]). Large ISPs with any
customer-learned or preferential (e.g. shorter) peer-learned paths to the leak destination will
prefer their existing route, so the [LR] only includes a subset of the leaker’s peers. Large ISP
peers advertising the leak to customers could reach many ASes, but as a provider-learned
route, the leak will be disadvantaged in the BGP decision process.
We see in Table A and Fig. 21 that small ISPs do not have the connectivity to propagate
leaks globally when the large ISP provider channel is blocked by Peerlock-lite. Under all
scenarios, most leak segments do not transit a small ISP (though they may be transited
during propagation into customer cones). This feature suggests a less prominent role in
route exchange for these networks relative to large ISPs.
To summarize, we find large ISPs are the most critical players in halting the spread and
installation of Tier 1 leaks. These networks are interconnected enough to globally disseminate
route leaks without the peering clique in many cases. Moreover, adding simple Peerlock-lite
filters at these ASes to the currently deployed Peerlock filters in the peering clique causes
a 94% reduction in total leak export across 6,840 leak simulations. Table A suggests that
peer connections among ISPs are the largest remaining vulnerability for Tier 1 leaks given
uniform large ISP Peerlock-lite deployment. These channels are out of reach for Peerlock-lite
as described, but could be mitigated by 1) additional peering relationships/Peerlock rules to
protect important leak targets and/or 2) complementary leak prevention systems like IRR
filtering.
4.6 Related Work
Smith et al.’s 2020 study on the efficacy of poison filtering for inbound re-routing [81] similarly
employed the PEERING framework to probe the behavior of remote networks. That work
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encountered some evidence for poison filtering, and noted that filtering rates increase with
poisoned AS degree, but did not seek to describe the underlying filtering mechanism or
measure which ASes filter poisons. Similarly, Birge-Lee et al. [6] and our own work in the
prior chapter 3 trialed poisons as primitives for novel BGP attacks. We and the SICO
authors both encountered filtering when attempting to poison large transit networks, but
did not examine filtering position or prevalence in that work.
Hlavacek et al. [26] introduced the DISCO system for preventing BGP hijacking. While
not designed to prevent route leaks, the approach taken by DISCO is ideologically similar
to Peerlock - DISCO emphasizes deployability/usability at the expense of some security
guarantees relative to RPKI/ROV filtering. This line of thinking is informed by a long history
of glacial deployment rates for security features that harden BGP including BGPSec [88] and
the RPKI [18, 62].
Previous work that relies on BGP poisoning often assumes 1) unpoisoned ASes will
forward poisoned updates and 2) poisoned ASes will drop such updates (see Section 2.4).
Katz-Bassett et al.’s LIFEGUARD fault detection and remediation system [37, 39], for
instance, employs poisoning to steer ASes around link failures. Smith and Schuchard’s Nyx
defense [82] depends on rerouting with poisons for DDOS/Link Flooding Attack mitigation.
Anwar et al.’s path discovery technique [2] is also driven by BGP poisoning. While we
discovered little evidence for general poison filtering, the prevalence of Tier 1/large transit
network filtering could present an obstacle to these systems. Specifically, the assumption
that unpoisoned networks will propagate poisons does not hold in all cases.
4.7 Conclusion
This work probes the current deployment of Peerlock/Peerlock-lite on the control plane with
active Internet measurements in Section 4.4. We find substantial evidence for deployment
of these leak defense systems, especially in large transit networks, and measure a rise in
Peerlock deployment within the peering clique during our experiments. While the range
of protected networks is still narrow within our observation window, with most filterers
protecting only Tier 1 ASes, many of the most disruptive recent route leaks contain these
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networks. Defensive systems [82, 39], measurement techniques [2], and attacks [6] that may
poison Peerlock-protected networks could inadvertently trigger these filters, and must not
assume poisons will be propagated by unpoisoned networks. BGP simulators should likewise
account for the presence of Peerlock to faithfully reproduce control plane behavior.
We also examine how the position and prevalence of filtering impacts leak propagation in
the AS-level topology in Section 4.5. Notably, we find that large ISPs filtering plays a major
role in global leak dissemination, signaling that Tier 1 clique deployment of Peerlock alone is
not sufficient to isolate leaks. Strategic placement of filters at these large transit providers,
which account for fewer than 1% of all ASes, completely mitigates 80% of simulated Tier 1
route leaks.
The MANRS filtering guide encourages AS PATH filtering by member ISPs, particularly
for screening customer advertisements, and gives Peerlock/Peerlock-lite as examples. But
these systems are not explicitly required, unlike IRR filtering (see [57] Section 4.1.1.1).
Given the many indirect/direct customers these networks serve, ISPs are best equipped and
best incentivized to deploy effective filters. Moreover, neither Peerlock nor Peerlock-lite is
technically complex or burdensome to configure. Therefore, we argue for broad application
of these common-sense leak prevention techniques by ISPs as a meaningful step in securing
inter-domain routing.
4.7.1 Operator Engagement
The preprint for the study behind this chapter was posted to the NANOG and RIPE
operator mailing lists in June and August 2020. While operator response was limited,
email correspondence around the study did yield some helpful insights. One European
AS operator claimed that at least one (and possibly additional) transit networks deployed
techniques similar to Peerlock around 2007, roughly ten years before NTT’s codification
of the method [84]. Separately, a Tier 1 network operator suggested that 1) differences in
network automation sophistication could account for observed uneven filtering within the
peering clique and 2) defensive filtering may have partially mitigated the Verizon/Cloudflare
leaks detailed in Section 1. This idea is supported by Cloudflare’s discussion on the
incident [45]. Cloudflare identifies some networks that filtered the leaks (including ASes
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1299 Telia, 2914 NTT, and 7018 AT&T). Bandwidth graphs presented in that post indicate
little or no impact on Cloudflare-to-AT&T data plane operation, while Cloudflare traffic to
leak propagator Verizon was drastically reduced for hours after the incident.
4.7.2 Future Directions
Widespread adoption of Peerlock will likely depend on addressing scalability issues. Rule
configuration currently requires non-standard, manual out-of-band communication between
protector/protected ASes. Automating this process is a crucial step in extending Peerlock
beyond core networks. Communities designating authorized upstreams for routes, as
proposed in [30], could take the place of out-of-band communication. Alternatively, RPKI
registration of direct/indirect customers [31] could distribute trusted topological information
relevant to filtering. In the next chapter, we present still another approach - RIB analysis
for automated "peer locking".
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Chapter 5
Automated Route Leak Protection for
Core Networks
5.1 Introduction
As seen in the prior chapter, the absence of a ground-truth, global AS-level topology is
central to the route leak problem. AS relationships are often considered business secrets and
held private by operators; without complete knowledge of all AS relationships, leaks cannot
be distinguished from valid routes with complete certainty. Many benign events, including
link failure response, load balancing, and new AS business relationships may demonstrate
the same rare export patterns seen in leaks.
The Peerlock system, introduced in Chapter 4, works to mitigate leaks by sharing
topological information between peering ASes. Protected ASes communicate their authorized
upstreams to protectors out of band; then, any route that transits the protected AS but
arrives from a non-authorized advertiser can be effectively filtered by the protector. This
pairing approach works to establish defenses between the largest ASes in the Internet’s core,
but as we observed in Section 4.4, its manual configuration costs have largely limited its
scope to protected Tier 1 ASes.
Unfortunately, as shown in Section 4.5, large ISPs can form a global channel for route
propagation even without Tier 1 participation. This dynamic motivates the development of
a simple, scalable approach to Peerlock-like route leak detection that can be applied broadly
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by large ISPs. The broad disparities present in networks’ sophistication, resources, and
incentives for deploying security systems also dictates that our system function without the
cooperation of smaller networks on the Internet’s fringe (stubs).
In this chapter, we introduce Corelock, an automated, simple, and scalable system for
defending against re-transmission of route leaks through the core. Section 5.3 describes
the "core enclave" ideal that underlies both Corelock and Peerlock. We also describe there
how Corelock builds minimally intrusive BGP route filters from CAIDA’s public provider-
peer observed customer cones [48] and relationship inferences. By combining well-known
topological abstractions with a simple, relationship-based ruleset, we aim to mitigate core
re-transmission leaks without intermediate network participation.
In Section 5.4.2, we demonstrate expected false positive rates for our system by gathering
routes from BGP collectors at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in the ARIN (North
America), LACNIC (Latin America/Caribbean), RIPE (Europe), AFRINIC (Africa), and
APNIC (Asia/Pacific) regions. We apply Corelock "filters" between large transit networks
on all observed routes, and record how often these routes violate Corelock rules. Overall, we
achieve a 5% violation ratio - that is, 5% of analyzed routes violate Corelock rules as deployed
between core ASes. Section 5.4.3 delves into why routes diverge from export expectations
built from historical routing data. While our notional Corelock deployment is sensitive to
correct and complete relationship inferences, deployers in practice will have full knowledge
of their next hop relationships.
Section 5.4.2 also matches routes that violate Corelock to those deployers were previously
using to reach violation destinations. We compare the performance-related characteristics
visible on the control plane - prefix and path length - as well as economic considerations like
next hop relationship. We find that violation routes are, on average, about half an AS-level
hop shorter than existing routes. Further, violation routes are modestly more likely to transit
settlement-free peering relationships: about 62% of violations arrived via peers versus 53%
of prior routes. However, we also show that
In this chapter, we make the following key contributions:
• We give an overview of the automated Corelock filtering system in Section 5.3.
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• We measure how often routes on the control plane depart from propagation patterns
expected by Corelock’s source abstractions, with analysis of our results, in Section 5.4.
• In the same section, we compare the properties of Corelock-violating routes to those
they replace.
• We consider how these results could change over time in Section 5.5.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Provider-Peer Observed Customer Cones
In Section 2.2, we introduced the recursive customer cone abstraction. These cones
are helpful for ranking an AS’s influence on the control plane, as well as understanding
relationships between remote ASes. However, ASes often build complex relationships that
blur traditional customer/provider/peer classification. For example, one AS may peer with
another in some regions/points-of-presence, but serve as a provider for the same AS at
another interconnection point (a hybrid relationship [20]). The customer cone’s recursive
construction ignores these complexities and assumes ASes provide transit for all customers
of downstream networks.
This simplification overestimates how many indirect customers an AS has, and limits
the usefulness of the recursive customer cone as a predictor of route export behavior.
The provider-peer observed or (PPO) customer cone [20] is a related abstraction designed
to address these limitations. PPO customer cones are built empirically, with ASes’
direct/indirect customer sets derived via analysis of routes that networks export to their
peers and providers, directly linking cone construction with observed policy decisions. For
this reason, PPO cones are used when making likely filtering inferences in Section 4.4.
The PPO customer cone technique is limited by route visibility, an important factor
given the incomplete distribution of public route collection points on the control plane [65].
However, as we observed in Section 4.4, collector placement (and, therefore, route visibility)
is biased toward the Internet’s core. The route leak prevention system introduced later in
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this chapter (in Section 5.3) relies only on these best observed networks’ PPO customer
cones.
5.3 The Corelock System
5.3.1 The Core Enclave Ideal
Internet-level networks vary greatly in sophistication, resources, and influence on the control
plane. About 50 ASes have customer cones with greater than 1,000 networks, but the vast
majority of registered networks (about 94% of all ASes) are stubs with 5 or fewer downstream
customers. In this chapter, we will refer to the large ISPs (those with 50 or more customer
cone members) and Tier 1 ASes as "core" networks. These ASes have been shown in prior
work to exert an outsized influence on the control plane [18] and to form virtually an exclusive
channel for global route propagation [55].
The concentration of routing influence within this relatively small set of networks is
potentially dangerous to Internet resiliency [1], but it also represents a clear opportunity
for securing the decentralized, heterogeneously administered control plane. The Peerlock
system [84] discussed in Chapter 4 recognizes this dynamic in its design, which enables
large transit provider partners to detect route leaks without the cooperation of intermediate
networks. However, Peerlock’s scalability is limited by its requirement for manual
configuration between every pair of participating networks. As shown in Section 4.4, Peerlock
deployment has not penetrated far beyond the Tier 1 peering clique that caps the routing
hierarchy.
Core networks and their providers account for just 1.5% of all ASes. These networks could
form an enclave preventing most external route leak propagation by uniformly applying a
simple rule - reject all routes that leave and re-enter the enclave, as shown in Fig. 22. With
this construction (a generalization of Peerlock), any route entering the enclave must arrive
via a customer or peer of some enclave AS, which we will call the entry point. If the entry
point learned about the new route from a peer, the entry point’s export should be restricted
to core and non-core customers. Conceptually, the route should only travel through core
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customers and "outward". Since no non-enclave ASes have customers in the enclave, the
route should not re-enter the enclave under the valley-free routing model. If the entry point
instead received the route from a customer, we expect wider export to all of the entry point’s
connections, both within and outside the enclave. Still, the route could only exit the enclave
by peering or customer links, so any re-entry to the enclave remains a valley-free routing
violation. Moreover, customer-advertised routes should arrive from the entry point’s own
customer cone, where the entry point’s topological visibility is greatest.
5.3.2 Corelock Design
While the enclave ideal is helpful for understanding how core ASes can prevent global
route leak propagation, it is highly unrealistic given the historical deployment rates for
BGP security extensions like BGPSec and RPKI/ROV. BGPSec still lacks any commercial
implementation, and the fewer than a quarter of prefix/origin pairs have valid ROAs stored
in the RPKI [62]. No governance structure exists to enforce a timely and uniform rollout
of security enhancements, even within the Internet’s core. Given this condition, we seek
instead to design a system that is simple, scalable, and effective in mitigating globally
disruptive Type 1-4 (topological) route leaks, even in partial deployment. Specifically, we
seek to provide Peerlock-like protection between the roughly 650 core ASes able to spread
routes globally without the need for Peerlock’s manual rule configuration. Like the Peerlock
system discussed in Chapter 4, non-topological leaks (like re-originations and full table spills,
e.g. [50]) are outside the scope of this system; these other leak types are easily remedied by
complementary security features like ROV and max-prefix filtering.
Here we present Corelock, a novel automated route leak defense system. Like Peerlock,
Corelock is designed to mitigate leaks between protector and protected ASes. Corelock
rules, however, are built from historical route analysis rather than manual configuration
between participants. This method enables greater scalability, as protectors can establish
protection rules for any remote AS without out-of-band communication. Filtering based on
prior behavior also addresses problems with the RFC definition of a leak — advertisement
beyond the advertiser’s intended scope [86]. Since we cannot determine operator intent, we
cannot designate advertisements as leaks with certainty. Our system uses historical behavior
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as a proxy for present intent by 1) collecting routes ASes have advertised over a one month
period and 2) using CAIDA’s PPO customer cones [48] built from this data to store export
behavior for all observed ASes. For our system, a "leak" (or violation) is an advertisement
that is topologically abnormal given prior month routing behavior. Of course, topological
churn and other benign deviations from prior routing behavior will produce false positives
in our system, so violations must be handled carefully.
Corelock addresses this potential problem by adopting violations when protectors lack
alternative routes to the violation destination prefix rather than filtering (dropping) them.
This approach is found in earlier work on mitigating anomalous routing events [36], and can
be implemented in practice by lowering the LOCAL PREF attribute of violations to some
minimum value rather than discarding them entirely. Falling back to violations in the absence
of other routes limits Corelock’s intrusiveness by ruling out any disconnections between
protector ASes and violation destinations that could result from filtering violations outright.
However, our system’s false positives may well cause protectors to miss opportunities to
install advantageous (e.g. less expensive or more performant) routes for "leaked" prefixes.
5.3.3 Corelock Protection Rules
Corelock protection rules are built from 1) classification of protector relationships with
neighboring/next hop ASes, and 2) provider-peer observed/PPO customer cones of the
protector, next hop, and protected ASes. PPO customer cones are rooted in observed AS
policy and account for hybrid/regionalized relationships, as they are derived from routes
exported to an AS’s provider/peers [48]. Specifically, an AS C is included in AS P ’s PPO
customer cone if, during a periodic analysis of globally-distributed public RIBs, AS P is
observed exporting routes through C to its providers and peers. Figure 23 demonstrates the
three filter types that Corelock deployers install on neighboring connections.
Customer connections receive the strictest treatment. For updates arriving over
these connections, any protected ASes present on the update’s route but absent from the
protector’s customer cone will be classified as a violation. This rule follows from the valley-
free routing model; we expect that the only ASes present on customer-learned routes will
be indirect customers. Routes are flagged on peer connections if any protected ASes on the
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route are missing from the peer’s customer cone, since peers should only exchange customer-
learned routes. Provider connections are the most difficult to vet, as providers are expected
to export virtually all selected routes to their customers. In this case, Corelock marks any
routes with more than one AS between the deployer and the first protected AS on the path
as violations. Clearly this prevents any intermediate route leaks; no matter the relationship
between the protected AS and the single intermediate AS, the intermediate AS is expected to
export the route to its customer. While this may seem overly restrictive, our system targets
large transit providers, who have relatively little traffic over connections to providers. We
show the relatively rarity of these provider-advertised violations in Section 5.4.
5.3.4 Incomplete Data and False Positives
Incorrect inferences or incomplete PPO customer cone source data are the primary sources
of false positives in Corelock. In our evaluation of a notional Corelock deployment in the
following section, we use CAIDA’s public monthly relationship and PPO datasets [98] to
build protection rules. Luckie et al. validate CAIDA’s relationship inference algorithm by
collecting validation data from operator submissions, Internet Routing Registry entries, and
relationship data embedded as communities in some BGP updates. Overall, they validate
about one-third of their inter-AS relationship inferences and find that roughly 95% of their
inferences are consistent with validation data. However, the peer-peer or provider-customer
inferences provided by CAIDA do not account for the complexity of AS relationships in
practice; ASes commonly vary their role with neighboring ASes on a per-prefix or per-region
basis [20]. These nuanced relationships are classified as provider-customer relationships by
CAIDA’s inference algorithm [48], meaning that they are subjected to the strictest Corelock
rules, which avoids propagation of potential leaks at the cost of additional false positives
in our experiment. In practice, protector ASes have ground-truth knowledge of their own
relationships with neighboring ASes; our notional false positive rate therefore represent an
upper-bound rather than an estimate of rates likely to be seen in deployment. Similarly,
incomplete PPO data will trigger violations (as protected ASes may be absent from providers’
inferred customers cones) at the expense of additional false positives.
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5.3.5 Alternative Approaches
Many other choices exist for topological abstractions that model route propagation.
Traditional customer cones could be used in place of PPO customer cones, but this approach
would overstate customer cone size, potentially permitting some leaks. Similarly, BGP-
observed customer cones [48] could be employed for this purpose. For some AS A, the BGP-
observed customer cone of A includes all ASes C reachable over any number of provider to
customer links from A on observed BGP paths. This provides a more accurate, policy-based
estimate of customer cones than the traditional approach, but still includes the customers of
A’s peers within A’s customer cone, artificially inflating its size and allowing more potential
leaks. A leak detection approach based outside of customer cones, such as identifying valid
upstreams/intermediate ASes between protector and protected ASes using route analysis, is
also possible [79]. However, these approaches have not demonstrated acceptable false positive
rates, and customer cones are a well-understood abstraction directly tied to expected route
propagation.
5.4 Simulating Corelock Deployment
5.4.1 Methodology
To evaluate Corelock, we establish a notional bidirectional deployment between the roughly
650 core ASes in CAIDA’s October 2020 AS relationship dataset [98] over a three month
period, November 2020-January 2021. For each month, we download all routes arriving at five
globally distributed RouteViews [99] and RIPE Routing Information Service [59] collectors
using BGPStream [65]. Each collector is located at a distinct Regional Internet Registry
(RIR) IXP; this placement allows us to cast a wide net, gathering routes from many regions
for analysis. Table A shows registry and geographic location information for the route data
sources in this experiment.
As we describe in the preceding section, Corelock flags routes as violations where PPO
customer cone information is incomplete. So, our primary objective for this experiment is to
discover the proportion of all routes marked as violations, the violation ratio for Corelock.
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To this end, we analyze each route arriving at our collectors during the study period, and
determine: 1) whether the route’s AS PATH violates expectations built from CAIDA’s PPO
customer cones, and if at least one notional protector and protected AS are present on
the path; and 2) whether Corelock would have marked the route as a violation. The first
item helps us understand the completeness of CAIDA’s PPO customer cones, and the second
provides an estimate for how frequently operators can expect the system to flag routes. Each
Corelock violation is recorded, and routes arriving after the violation are checked to see if
they resolve the violation - that is, if the later route demonstrates that the protector has
switched onto a non-flagged path to the destination prefix. We "refresh" the PPO customer
cones and relationship inferences used by Corelock every month to ensure the freshness of
information provided to Corelock.
Further, we investigate the opportunity cost incurred by false positive classifications.
While we lack the data-plane information necessary to fully quantify the performance
difference between the paths networks use previous to and after installing violating routes, we
will compare the prefix and path length of violation routes and the routes installed previously
by protectors for the same destination. We also endeavour to understand the economic cost
of downgrading violations’ LOCAL PREF. These downgrades may incur monetary expenses
when deployers flag less expensive routes (e.g., those transiting customers) and are forced to
install routes transiting peers - or worse, providers.
This investigation of costs is conducted after the initial experiment gather routes flagged
by Corelock. For each violation at the RouteViews Equinix collector, rveqix, we search the
most recent RIB dump for the collector where the violation was discovered in an attempt to
locate the route the protector was previously using to reach the violation destination. We
look both for direct matches, as well as less-specific (supernets) of the violation destination
prefix. Such a matching is not always present in RIB dumps; the presence of the prior-used
route depends on the export behavior of all ASes between protector and collector.
5.4.2 Evaluation
In total, we analyzed nearly 15 billion BGP updates, 98.6% of which transit at least one
notional deployer (core AS). 2.8 billion routes (19.6%) violated export expectations built
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from CAIDA PPO customer cones for at least one on-path AS (orange bars). Our Corelock
"deployers" marked 750 million updates as violations, achieving an overall violation ratio
of 5.1% (red bars). Importantly, operators’ full, contractual knowledge of their next hop
relationships means this number represents an upper bound rather than a precise estimate
of Corelock’s expected false positive rate. Figure 24 shows our results split by collector. The
per-collector violation ratio ranged from a low of 2.5% at the rrc01 collector in London to a
high of 13.5% at Sao Paulo-based rvsp.
In Figure A we display a breakdown of the inferred relationships between the protector
and its next hop relationship (the advertising neighbor) for each violation at the North
American collector, rveqix. Nearly 80% of all violations arrived via peers, while
just 6% were advertised to the protector by its customers. This feature is consistently
observed at all other collectors, as well, and meets our expectations as we will address in
the following discussion. Provider-delivered violations - which occur whenever a provider
delivers a route that transits at least one intermediate ASes before reaching another core AS
- were responsible for less than one in six violations.
We found prior route matches (supernet or exact) for 16% of violation destinations during
our follow-on investigation into the routes protectors were using before receiving violation
updates (prior routes). The prefix distribution of prior and violation routes match almost
exactly as shown in Figure A, and closely mirror overall Internet prefix distribution statistics
as reported by monitoring projects like Potaroo [28]. Figure A shows the proportion of prior
and violation routes learned from inferred providers, peers, and customers of protector ASes
for which matches were found. While the next hop relationship distribution shown here does
not match the distribution of recorded violations, it does follow the distribution of BGP
updates seen arriving at core ASes during the study period at this collector. The relationship
distribution of matches between violation and There is a clear shift from provider-learned
prior routes to cheaper, peer-learned violations; this means that downgrading violation
LOCAL PREFs will likely have some economic cost to deployers.
This economic cost is informed both by next hop relationship differences between routes,
as well as the duration of time violations are installed. Figure A shows the cumulative
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distribution of violation times for routes observed at the rveqix collector, November 2020-
January 2021, in cases when our framework allowed us to observe a switch. In this
experiment, we only track violations for resolution over 24 hours; exceeding this time limit is
infeasible with our current hardware memory constraints. Roughly half (56%) of routes were
resolved within this window. As shown in Figure A, nearly 90% of violations are transient
(last less than 30 minutes). Performance costs are harder to measure, as control plane path
characteristics are insufficient alone to determine data plane latency. However, we did see a
significant difference in path length between prior routes and violations. Prior routes were
6.4 hops in length on average, compared to 5.9 hops in violation routes. Both of these
numbers are higher than the average path length reported by control plane measurement
project Potaroo [28], which hovers around 4.5 hops.
5.4.3 Discussion
It is reasonable to ask whether the violations observed during in this section were the
result of erroneous routing events (true leaks) or false positives. Our analysis reveals that
violations are highly concentrated on certain links; for instance, the majority of violations
(18m/134m, or 51%) of violations observed at rveqix occurred at just 5 links between 16
ASes. Similar concentrations were observed at other collectors. Moreover, violation rates are
spread evenly across the observation window rather than clustered at certain points. These
results indicate that it is highly likely that the overwhelming majority of recorded violations
are false positives, since true route leaks would travel across many links and demonstrate
violation "hot spots" in time. The extreme concentration of violations on certain links (but
not a single advertiser) also suggests either incorrect/incomplete relationship inferences are
behind many false positives, meaning that ASes in practice (who know their own neighboring
relationships completely) may encounter many fewer false positives in practice.
The variance in violation ratio observed at difference collectors is a surprising result
from our study. At rveqix, just 4.2% of routes triggered Corelock, while rvsp saw a
violation ratio of 13.5%. Here violations are likewise concentrated on a few link relationships.
However, at this location the top 5 links connect only 4 ASes. Brazil’s academic backbone,
AS1916 National Education and Research Network, advertised the overwhelming majority
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of observed violations at rvsp (about 140m/144.5m or 97%) to its peers. It is difficult to
orthogonalize the effects of relationship misclassification and incomplete customer cones, but
it is likely that complex relationships play some role, since many violation routes are observed
month after month. CAIDA’s PPO customer cones source data from this same collector,
meaning that incomplete customer cone information would be corrected over time, and is
unlikely to be responsible for such persistent violations. Overall, our results indicate that a
more complex model for AS relationships (including hybrid relationships) is likely necessary
to reduce system false positives to an acceptable level for deployment.
Across collectors, peer links represented between 74% and 91% of all violations. This
result meets our expectation, because core ASes connections are dominated by peering
links, and core ASes hear more updates from peers than from providers and customers.
At rveqix, for instance, core ASes in our study received 47% of updates from peers, 28.5%
from providers, and under a quarter from customers. Moreover, provider and customer-
learned violation designations are dependent upon only core AS customer cone information,
but flagging a peer route requires knowledge of the peer’s customer cone. Some peers will lie
outside the core, where our ability to observe updates (and build complete customer cones)
is limited. Given these factors, and that Corelock marks routes as violations when customer
cone information is incomplete, it is not unusual that the majority of violations are received
over peering connections.
Our efforts to quantify the cost of Corelock are limited by our ability to fully observe
control plane traffic. Just 16% of violations were matched to prior routes in RIBs. While
we observed clear movement from provider-learned prior routes to peer-learned violations,
the cost of "missing" peer-learned routes may be mitigated by the transient nature of many
violations.
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5.5 Relevant Historical Trends
5.5.1 Stability of the Internet’s Core Membership
Corelock is predicated on core ASes monitoring the presence of remote core ASes on routes to
detect leaks, as these backbone ASes can distribute routes globally. So, changes to core AS
membership over time will change the filtering requirements for deployers and the breadth
of the systems’ protection as notionally deployed. In total, 671 ASes were observed with
customer cones over size 50 during the course of our study period (November 2020 - January
2021). About 91% of these remained in the set for the entire study period, with just 61
membership edits during this period. For a wider view, we compare core AS sets in November
of 2017 and 2020. Over this longer period, 681 ASes reached core designation, with 257 total
edits, and has grown by 20% from 540 to 652 ASes.
5.5.2 Longitudinal Evaluation of Violation Rate
While we did not observe significant changes in violation rates during our three month
observation window, it is possible that longer term trends in the AS-level topology could
challenge the feasibility of the Corelock system. To address this possibility, we repeat our
RIB analysis experiment from Section 5.4 at the RouteViews Equinix collector with data
from November of 2017, 2018, and 2019. The results of this year-over-year comparison is
shown in Figure 29. While the total number of updates is variable given control plane
conditions, IXP membership levels, and other factors, the proportion of updates flagged for
Corelock violations falls under 6% in every month examined. No clear positive or negative
trends were observed in violation rates over time.
5.6 Related Work
BGP security research often emphasizes deployability/usability at the expense of provable
security guarantees. This line of thinking is informed by a long history of glacial design
and deployment rates for formal security extensions for BGP, like BGPSec [88] and the
RPKI [18, 62]. For example, Karlin et al.’s Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP) [36], Sermpezi et
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al.’s ARTEMIS [77] and Hlavacek et al.’s DISCO [26] hijacking mitigation systems, and
Subramanian et al.’s Listen and Whisper [92] system all enable local network operators to
detect and/or respond to routing problems without global participation or a robust trust
infrastructure. Unfortunately, all of the above work is designed and evaluated primarily for
protection against BGP hijacks, not route leaks.
Siddiqui et al.’s recent route leak detection (RLD) technique [79], like our proposed
work, aims to provide operators with a practical technique for filtering likely leaks without
the technical burden of a trust infrastructure or the challenge of inter-AS cooperation. RLD
unfortunately only leverages local BGP data, and is therefore ineffective in some critical
situations, such as detecting peer-advertised leaks. Active control plane probing is suggested
as a remedy for these deficiencies, but we assess that operators are unlikely to send bogus
messages to peering ASes. Our approach fuses outside data sources with an AS’s local
relationship knowledge to build a less intrusive system.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the Corelock system and evaluated its notional deployment
across roughly 650 large transit providers. A number of key findings stand out from this
work.
First, we have shown that meaningful, Peerlock-like filters can be built in an automated
fashion from historical routing data. Nearly 80% of all updates we observed on the control
plane are consistent with our export model, which is built from CAIDA’s published AS
relationship inferences and provider-peer observed customer cones. Future work could apply
a more sophisticated model of AS relationships - like the one found in [20] - to route leak
detection.
Next, we note that the assumption that networks behave homogeneously across regions
is dangerous. Like [20], who noted European ASes were more likely to form complex
relationships, we observed varied behavior at different geographic locations on the control
plane. Our false positive rate varied from less than 3% in London to over 13.5% at a South
American collector. ARIN ASes make up just 21% of all core ASes, but have twice the
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average customer cone size of any other region. Future systems should account for this
regionalism in their design and evaluation to produce meaningful results.
It is important to note that neither Peerlock nor Corelock prevent all route leaks. Max-
prefix, ROV, and other complementary filtering systems should be applied to combat non-
topological route leaks. Even with wide Corelock deployment, there is still a danger from
pre-core leaks within core AS customer cones. For these, ASes must monitor their own
customer cones, by enforcing up-to-date IRR entries or using automated detection systems
like RLD [79].
Finally, We further observe that our work, in this and other chapters, is greatly challenged
by the lack of public vantage points on the control plane. Exposing more ground-truth data
on AS relationships and routes is critical to advancing BGP research. Both relationship
inferences and customer cones are only as good as their input data, and both more and
better data is needed to improve the quality and completeness of these abstractions.
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Chapter 6
Future Direction and Conclusion
6.1 Future Work
6.1.1 Routing-Enabled DDoS
Our work in Chapter 3 demonstrates that a routing-capable adversary can manipulate attack
flows using poisoned control plane announcements. Poisoning is a broadly effective tool for
limiting path export at the AS level [81], but leak prevention systems and other filters limit
poison propagation through the peering clique [55]. The SICO attack [6] demonstrated the
viability of BGP communities as an alternative export control mechanism. While poisons
represent a simple, direct approach, the communities supported by many transit providers
(e.g. AS2914 NTT [63]) give downstream operators a broad toolset of supported path-export
control options. These options include regional restrictions and even neighbor-specific export
limitations. The Maestro and Leak attacks described in Sections 3.4 and 3.6, respectively,
could use these more nuanced path control primitives to great effect. For instance, an attacker
could limit the visibility of attack announcements for greater stealth, especially given that
communities are often stripped from updates after their effect is applied.
Our attacks use only traditional botnets as flow sources; reflection attacks, e.g. [52]
or other malicious flow sources could likely be steered with the same approaches. These
alternate sources could have a very different topological and/or geographic distribution
relative to the major botnets evaluated in our attack, which are highly concentrated in a
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handful of networks. Our live Internet demonstration "attacks" in Section 3.5, however, are
driven by widely dispersed flow sources, suggesting that this is not an obstacle to successfully
executing Maestro.
Maestro is demonstrated with a single prefix and target link; it is likely the attack could
be extended to multiple, strategically placed links to effect an "Internet blockade" as in [35].
Such a broad attack might use multiple prefixes or BGP communities to separately steer
flows from disparate parts of the Internet, funneling traffic over major points of connection
into/out of a target region or installation. Given the critical importance of the Internet in
modern society as the channel for financial markets and other critical activities, such an
attack could have devastating consequences even if rapidly mitigated.
6.1.2 Mitigating Leaks
Chapters 4 and 5 give practical tools to transit providers seeking to insulate their networks
from topological route leaks. The primary challenge in arresting route leaks is the mismatch
between information available to operators - their own local routing "neighborhood" - and
the scope of control plane routes, which span the entire Internet. Increasing the visibility
of direct/indirect AS relationships, e.g. by registering customer cones in the RPKI [31] or
embedding more topological information in communities [30], would greatly simplify this
challenge.
A parallel can be drawn between the route leak detection challenge and the primary
challenge in BGP research - the well-known AS topology incompleteness problem. The
control plane is global, with a complex and ever-shifting hierarchy of ASes working under
independent control to connect hosts over the Internet. Without ground-truth knowledge
of AS relationships (that includes policy, not merely connectivity), BGP research is limited
to simulations, conjectures, and inferences about AS policy and thus, the behavior of the
control plane at large.
Resources like BGPStream [65] provide critical points of observation for research, but as
shown in Chapter 5, making sweeping statements about the control plane from limited points
of observation can produce misleading results. Network policy in BGP is extremely flexible,
and the AS relationship structure varies from region to region. However, incentivizing ASes
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to expose their control plane traffic could be difficult, as this reveals information about their
business relationships without providing a clear benefit (in narrow terms) to the network
itself. Nevertheless, locating additional control plane perspectives is vital to advancing BGP
security research as a field.
The definition of "route leaks" is also problematic from an academic perspective, since
it relies on unobservable (or difficult to observe) notions like operator intent. Future work
could examine disruptive routing events more broadly, perhaps by associating control plane
abnormalities with observed disruptions on the data plane using tools like CAIDA’s Internet
Outage and Detection Analysis (IODA) tool [8]. This fusion of data plane and control plane
events could reduce the ambiguity associated with "route leaks" and serve as a productive
avenue for future work on this topic.
6.2 Conclusion
This work began by demonstrating the threat posed by malicious actors who gain routing
capability in Chapter 3 - such an adversary can manipulate the control plane to expose
links to unintended traffic and/or direct malicious botnet flows with novel control. This
chapter, as well as numerous highly disruptive routing failures in recent years [40, 22, 103,
78, 95, 50, 51], demonstrate that both malicious and unintentional route leaks pose a present
threat to the proper functioning of the Internet. Our work in Chapters 4 and 5, on the
other hand, demonstrate that network operators can deploy pragmatic solutions to limit
their exposure to these events and protect themselves and their customers. Taken together,
these ideas demonstrate our thesis: Malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten Internet
availability, but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact.
Global route leaks and hijacks demonstrate the inherent fragility of an Internet built
on a control plane that lacks cryptographic hardening of routes and other essential security
features. It is important to note that these events are occurring within an environment of
broad cooperation between network operators; that is, both leaks and hijacks are almost
universally the result of misconfiguration rather than hostile intent. In general, operators
across polities are working together to preserve a functioning global network. While
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geopolitical foes have frequently used the Internet as a medium for delivering and defending
against cyberattacks [27], attacks against the Internet infrastructure itself are less well-
known. BGP has been weaponized for targeted hijacks, e.g. [16], but we do not know of any
direct attempts at cyber-sabotage of the control plane. We have shown in Chapter 3 that
adversaries can exploit routing capability to expose targets and channel attacks; it is certain
that advanced persistent threats could and would leverage the control plane to pursue their
objectives.
At the same time, the number of actors with routing control is ballooning rapidly.
In November of 2017, the control plane was composed of about 59,000 ASes; at the
time of this writing (2021), there are over 70,000 such networks. This growth introduces
additional complexity and increases the opportunity for mistakes and misconfiguration.
It is encouraging that security features like RPKI-based Route Origin Validation [62] are
gathering steam to address the threat posed by hijacks, additional work is needed to build
resiliency against leaks and other adverse routing events into the control plane. Next
generation architectures like SCION [102] provide a roadmap for building a secure-by-design
Internet control plane, but it is unclear when (or if) these technologies will replace BGP for
directing flows between networks. In the meantime, pragmatic, common-sense solutions can
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Figure 1: 2019 Verizon/Cloudflare leak. Other destination services were also affected.
Figure 2: BGP poisoning. AS 1 originates a route with AS 2 prepended to path; AS 2
filters the update, but AS 3 propagates.
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(a) Betweenness-based link se-
lection
(b) Bot-to-bot flow density
selection
(c) Bot-to-any flow density
selection
Figure 3: Flow density gain results (post-attack density - pre-attack density) by link
selection strategy, Mirai botnet model
(a) Flow density CDF,
provider to customer.
(b) Success at varying cus-
tomer cone depths.
(c) Success by link relation-
ship.
Figure 4: Deeper look at the customer attack success, betweenness link sample
(a) AS-level edge betweenness of
Internet links
(b) Flow density (bot-to-bot) by
betweenness
(c) Flow density (bot-to-any) by
betweenness
Figure 5: LFA vulnerability as function of betweenness
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Figure 6: Maestro: BGP poisons collapse botnet traffic onto a target link.
Figure 7: Reversing relationship to
attack cust. to prov. links. Figure 8: Attacking cust. to prov. links.
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Figure 9: Maestro performance when missing traceroute hops and bot routes compared to
complete information
Figure 10: Notional "botnet" distribution.
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(a) Topology prior to leak attack
execution
(b) Post-attack topology (c) Flow density CDF for
leak attack on core links
Figure 11: Valley-path leak attack overview and results
Table 1: Opportunistic Maestro: key links exposed to Maestro vs. Crossfire.
Maestro Vuln. Crossfire Vuln.
Avg Stddev Avg Stddev
Stub AS 29 35 14 16
Small ISP 40 49 19 23
Large ISP 35 41 16 18
Table 2: Strategic Adversary: Maestro result summary, provider to customer betweenness
link selection, customer-only attack
Vuln. Before Vuln. After Avg Adversaries Stddev Adversaries
Vuln. Threshold 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Mirai 0.44 0.18 0.09 0.97 0.91 0.87 135.45 114.64 91.22 349.69 312.94 215.85
Conficker 0.44 0.21 0.08 0.96 0.91 0.85 151.25 100.01 92.35 360.26 226.39 216.06
Blackenergy 0.38 0.23 0.10 1.00 0.94 0.87 130.61 103.98 92.48 335.06 273.92 217.14
Table 3: Common leak filtering systems.
System Coverage Requirements Notes
RPKI/ROV Type 5 internal leak,Type 6 re-origination
RPKI trust infrastructure,
local ROA registration &
remote ROV checks
Type 5 coverage depends on optional ROA max length
IRR Filtering
Potentially all leak types;
depends on stored policy
object specificity.
Correct, fresh policy objects &
derived filters along potential leak
path
Quality issues, misaligned incentives
Max Prefix All leak types
Filter with meaningful max prefix
limit somewhere on potential leak
path
Only effective when many prefixes are leaked
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(a) Flow density CDF by number
of poisons
(b) Flow density CDF against
path filtering
(c) Flow density CDF by various
AS filtering sets
Figure 12: Evaluation of Maestro defenses
Figure 13: Simple Peerlock deployment. Protector AS filters updates containing the peer
Protected AS from unauthorized propagators.
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Figure 14: Example Peerlock-lite deployment. Provider AS filters updates from its
customer that include a Tier 1 AS.
Figure 15: Measurement experiment depiction. Inferences are made about Peerlock
deployment based on differences between normal updates (left) vs. poisoned updates (right)
arriving at collectors.
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(a) Number of protector/protected rules by
ASN. Protector numbers include ASes protecting
their own ASN via loop detection.
(b) Depiction of Tier 1 protection rules.
Figure 16: Tier 1s filtering Tier 1 leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
(a) Blue lines show poison filtering; red lines
depict Tier 1 leak filtering.
(b) Blue bars show no. ASes in observation
window; red bars show no. ASes filtering at least
1 Tier 1 leak.
Figure 17: Overall filtering of Tier 1 leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
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(a) Overall filtering levels for Tier 1 peer leaks.
Max and likely poison inferences match for this
set.
(b) Tier 1 filtering of Tier 1 peer leaks (peers
within clique excluded).
Figure 18: Tier 1 peer leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
Figure 19: Tier 1 leak filtering for MANRS/non-MANRS ASes.
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Figure 20: Example simulated leak. Dashed red lines indicate route leak to other
providers/peers.
(a) Impact of various deployment scenarios on
leak update propagation.
(b) Note increased Peerlock-lite performance for
path switching vs. leak update propagation.
Figure 21: Peerlock/Peerlock-lite simulation results.
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Table 4: Most common encodings with number and percentage of ASes exporting leaks.
Common Leak Segment Encodings
Scenario/Encoding No. exporting ASes % of exporting ASes
No filters 141,797,992 100%
[LR, LP] 14,892,311 11%
[TP] 10,254,707 7%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,683,968 6%
Inferred 108,030,704 100%
[LP, LP] 14,325,960 13%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,675,841 8%
[SR, LP] 5,169,427 5%
Full T1 101,024,444 100%
[LR, LP] 14,246,024 14%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,978,175 9%
[SR, LP, LP] 5,163,786 5%
Full T1 + large ISP lock 69,638,282 100%
[LR, LP] 9,473,820 14%
[LR, LP, LP] 5,899,779 8%
[SR, LP] 3,310,842 5%
Inferred + large ISP lite 8,005,724 100%
[LR] 2,537,276 32%
[LR, TP] 1,281,620 16%
[LR, SP] 653,167 8%
Full T1 + large ISP lite 5,215,232 100%
[LR] 2,386,597 46%
[LR, SP] 679,076 13%
[SR] 412,399 8%
Full T1 + large ISP both 4,649,828 100%
[LR] 2,023,579 44%
[LR, SP] 584,124 13%
[SR] 407,661 9%
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Table 5: Analyzing leak segments by UCLA classes transited.
Transited AS Statistics
Scenario Segment Length Tier 1s Large ISPs Small ISPs
average std. dev % paths average std. dev % paths average std. dev % paths average std. dev
No filters 4.4 1.8 27% 0.2 0.4 89% 2.3 1.6 40% 0.7 0.8
Inferred 4.6 1.8 7% 0.5 0.2 98% 2.5 1.5 45% 0.8 0.9
Full T1 4.7 1.8 0% 0.0 0.0 98% 2.6 1.5 46% 0.8 0.9
Full T1 + large ISP lock 4.8 2.1 0% 0.0 0.0 98% 2.7 1.6 50% 0.9 1.0
Inferred + large ISP lite 2.9 1.0 35% 0.3 0.5 72% 0.6 0.5 42% 0.8 1.0
Full T1 + large ISP lite 2.7 1.1 0% 0.0 0.0 74% 0.6 0.5 47% 1.0 1.1
Full T1 + large ISP both 2.7 1.1 0% 0.0 0.0 71% 0.6 0.5 49% 1.0 1.1
Figure 22: The "core enclave" concept - routes only permitted to transit the enclave once.
Table 6: Route Collectors in Corelock Study.
Corelock Experiment Collectors
Collector Name Location Service RIR Region
rrc01 LINX/LONAP (UK) RIS RIPE Europe
rrc19 NAPAfrica (South Africa) RIS AFRINIC Africa
rvsg SG1 Equinix (Singapore) RouteViews APNIC Asia/Pacific
rveqix Equinix (US) RouteViews ARIN North America
rvsp PTT Metro/NIC.br (Brazil) RouteViews LACNIC Latin America/Caribbean
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Figure 23: Corelock: RIB-analysis based filtering.
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Figure 24: Corelock update classification by regional collectors, 11/20-01/21. Error bars
show std. dev.
Figure 25: Violations by CAIDA inference of next-hop relationship, 11/20-01/21,
RouteViews Equinix.
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Figure 26: Protector next hop relationship, violation vs. prior routes (subset), 11/20-01/21,
RouteViews Equinix.
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Figure 27: Prefix length, IPv4 violation vs. prior routes (subset), 11/20-01/21, RouteViews
Equinix.
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Figure 28: Duration of violations resolved under 24 hours (when observable), 11/20,
RouteViews Equinix.
Figure 29: Corelock update classification, November, 2017-2020, RouteViews Equinix.
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